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 The Potential of America’s Army the Video Game 
as Civilian-Military Public Sphere 
 
 
“Citizens. Countries. Video Games. The US Army keeps them all free.” 
- America’s Army video game advertising slogan, 2003 
 
“Here, then, we have the first main characteristic of play: 
that it is free, is in fact freedom. 
A second characteristic is closely connected to this, 
namely that play is not ‘ordinary’ or ‘real’ life.” 
- Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens, 1950:8 
 
“The severe discrepancy in the scale of consequence makes the 
comparison of war and gaming nearly obscene, the analogy either trivializing 
the one or, conversely, attributing to the other a weight of motive and 
consequence it cannot bear.” 
- Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain, 1985:83 
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 [NOTE: Refer to accompanying CD-ROM for America’s Army digital 
artifacts mentioned in the text. ] 
 
Introduction 
 
The basic aim of this thesis is to assess the US Army produced video 
game America’s Army1(2002) and its online communities for its potential as a 
public sphere.  My exploration of the game, and the communities which have 
grown around it, will be mainly based on observations of social formations and 
practices of the game, and interviews with players. Additional data was gathered 
from a visit to the US Military Academy at West Point where the US Army 
organization behind the game project, the Office of Economic and Manpower 
Analysis (OEMA) is based.  
 
Gulf War 2, 2003  
Most of the data-gathering and research for this thesis was conducted in 
the months immediately prior, during, and after Gulf War 2 in the first half of 
2003. On March 20, 2003 - the day the official US-led coalition campaign of Gulf 
War 2 began - I spent eight hours wandering in and out of America’s Army 
missions (whilst I had the internet simultaneously broadcasting the live 
reportage of the BBC).  I hoped to make observations about what the games 
players were saying about the outbreak of war as it happened, and what they 
felt about acting out virtual infantry combat at the time when real combat by US 
ground troops was beginning in Iraq. A new mission level, called “Radio Tower” 
– depicting a paradrop assault on an enemy radio station in a Middle Eastern 
desert, had been released by the development team only a few days before and 
the servers were busy with players playing the level for the first time. 
                                                     
1  
see the website www.americasarmy.com 
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 I was surprised to find, at least in my experience that night, that there 
was very little discussion of the outbreak of war. It was more common for the 
players to express a reluctance or even annoyance about the idea of discussing 
the unfolding events in the Gulf. The players who were active in the missions 
were there for escapism and for entertainment. For most, the idea of discussing 
real war seemed to threaten their sense of carefree pleasure and represented 
the encroachment of the serious into the liminal space of gameplay. 
Furthermore, it was noticeable that those with the most investment in the reality 
of war - the real military personnel players - were largely absent that night.  It 
seemed that those who were most seriously concerned about the war were away 
from the computer and watching television news.  
America’s Army is unique as the first state-production of video game 
popular culture for the purposes of strategic communication with the public – in 
addition, it is unique as a space where the public can come into contact with the 
gamespace’s core constituency of actual active duty and military personnel. The 
starting point of this thesis was my curiousity that night about why there was not 
more discourse about the political events of the real world which bore such 
direct resonance with virtual gamespace. Or to put in another way, could the 
America’s Army gamespace hold latent potential as a civilian-military public 
sphere? 
 
America’s Army the Video Game 
For the main part, America’s Army is a multiplayer networked game of the 
extremely popular tactical “first-person shooter” (FPS) genre2. It was given a 
“Teen Rating” for violent but goreless gameplay by the Entertainment Standards 
Ratings Board. Using the latest version of the Unreal advanced 3D game engine 
                                                     
2   For the uninitiated, a “first-person shooter” video game generally involves violent gameplay 
with guns etc. from the first-person perspective of a 3-D environment. A “tactical” FPS 
emphasizes more realistic weapons modeling, sophisticated tactics, and co-ordinated teamplay, 
and its game arenas and missions are constructed according to a realist aesthetic. 
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 software, the game consists of a typical gameplay environment associated with 
the genre of tactical FPSs. This environment was structured in terms of 10 
minute missions between two competing human teams who control avatars in a 
variety of landscapes. The players communicate via on-screen chat or (more 
effectively) through audio headsets (“voice comms”). The graphics, sound, and 
gameplay are designed to accurately model Army equipment, training locations, 
jargon, and so on. Mission scenarios are grouped in categories identified with 
real life Army divisions. The range of game missions already created or planned 
will encompass the full range of Army combat roles - including military police, 
medical “combat life-savers”, armored infantry, and special forces, as well as 
regular infantry. Scenario design range from the realistic depiction of actual 
Army training locations (in which virtual laser training weaponry is used rather 
than virtual live weapons) to fictional geographical locations for active duty 
mission scenarios. There are hundreds of America’s Army clans, many of them 
with their own website communities, active in competing in FPS game 
tournament spaces such as www.teamwarfare.com, and renting their own 
servers (a major cost saving for the Army).  
Aware of the potential political sensitivity of such a project, the game 
structure was designed to reflect the values of the Army as an institution 
concerned with the ethical and legitimate conduct of war, as well as 
demonstrating a certain degree of political neutrality. For instance, a key 
directive for the game design was that players should not be able to play in such 
a way that they are rewarded for the killing of virtual American soldiers. 
Accordingly, each player sees members of his own team as American (with an 
ethnically mixed team of avatars), and the opposing human team members as 
enemies (the OPFOR or opposing force). OPFOR teams are portrayed as coming 
from one of a variety of broad ethnic backgrounds (Latin American, Arab, 
European) depending on the (anonymous) geography of the mission scenario. 
“Player-killing” - the targeting of your own team members - is punished by quick 
ejection from the mission-in-play into the representation of a military prison, and 
 
 
6 
 the reduction of the player’s rating. Team-playing and the securing of realistic 
Army mission objectives are set as official mission tasks rather than the general 
reward of killing seen in many other games of this genre.  Typical missions 
include parachute training jumps, operations set in desert areas reminiscent of 
Central Asia or North Africa, and the “homeland security” defense of an Alaskan 
oil pipeline station from terrorist attack. 
 
America’s Army Project Rationale 
America’s Army has been successful beyond expectations, winning a “Best 
of Show” award when it was launched at the 2002 E3 Expo (the major trade 
show for the electronic entertainment industry)3, has maintained a presence in 
the top 10 most played online games since its public release4, and by August 
2003, there were almost 2 million registered players who had played over 185 
million 10-minute missions5 - this ranks high with the most popular of 
commercial video games. The America’s Army project was conceived as a 
strategic communication tool (i.e. a branding and marketing initiative, 
particularly but not exclusively associated with the US Army’s recruiting effort). It 
is notable not only as the first commercial game project entirely “created by the 
Army, designed by the Army, developed by the Army... because no one gets the 
Army like the Army!” (as one launch video trailer had it), but also the first 
product developed entirely by the US military designed for dissemination within 
the domain of commercial entertainment popular culture.  
                                                     
3  
The 2002 and 2003 E3 trade shows were notable for the unprecedented introduction of a  
significant military presence, in order to advertise the America’s Army game. This presence 
included armored fighting vehicles, real soldiers rappeling from a helicopter, bomb disposal 
robots, and the recreation of an Afghan village. Prior to this, E3 military presence had only 
consisted of actors playing soldiers for war game stalls. 
4  
According to the leading online games portal, www.gamespy.com 
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5  On August 10th, 2003, with the release of version 1.9 of the game, America’s Army recorded 
the highest daily player activity ever, with over 2.1 million missions played on that date - almost 
treble the usual average. Each mission involved up to 24 players. (statistics from 
www.americasarmy.com) 
 
 
 
 First proposed in August 1999, the development process for the project 
was given funding approval in June 2000 at approximately $7m (and $2m a year 
cost for support and development until 2007) and involving the employment of 
veteran game developers from the commercial industry, based at the MOdeling, 
Virtual Environments and Simulations (MOVES) institute at the US Naval 
Postgraduate School at Monterey, California. The game is being distributed 
mainly as a free download or CD-ROM for PCs, with the July 2003 release of a 
Macintosh pay-version, and future plans for the licensing of console versions.
The primary official goals of the project are to support Army recruiting 
efforts, particularly of teenagers with high-tech aptitude and skills; raise the 
positive profile of the Army as an interesting, high-skilled organization; and to 
promote the revival of military-civilian grassroots contact. These goals are all 
urgent missions for the Army - it has the most manpower-intensive requirements 
of any branch of the military, and in the late 1990s, had problems meeting 
recruitment targets due partly to the inferior public image of the Army compared 
to other military branches6 , and the decline of the gradual veteran presence in 
civilian communities7. The need for new recruitment is also greatly heightened 
at the moment as Army resources are being stretched to the limit with the new 
troop-intensive military doctrines in operation with the occupation of Iraq and 
the continuing “War on Terror” 8. And furthermore, the current Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA) policy perspective requires a higher level of technically 
                                                     
6  
According to an Army-commissioned 1999 study by the advertising agency, Leo Burnett, the 
Army was regarded as the most ordinary, dangerous and “dirty”, of the four main branches of 
the military, whilst also lagging badly behind in perceptions of elite status and being a high-tech 
organization. 
7  For a detailed major study of the recent problems and challenges of “the civilian-military gap” 
for the US military, see Soldiers and Civilians  (eds. Feaver & Kohn, 2001), published by the 
Triangle Institute for Security Studies. For comprehensive survey research on the changing 
attitudes of American youth towards military recruitment since 1975, refer to the RAND 
Corporation’s ongoing Youth Attitudes Tracking Study (YATS).  
8 
 given the tendency seen after US troops have returned home after previous conflicts, there is 
likely to be sharp falls in the numbers of active duty and reserve personnel re-enlisting or 
extending their contracts after they return from duty in the Gulf or Afghanistan. This will make 
strategic communication efforts such as America’s Army all the more urgent. 
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 skilled and adept recruits to support the high-tech digitally-enhanced Army 
combat organization of the future9 . 
One of the strongest arguments made in support of the America’s Army 
project is that the impact of the game is much more cost-effective than other 
forms of media marketing the US Army uses. For instance, free distribution of 
the game through online downloads and partnership video game magazine CD-
ROMS make distribution costs to minimal levels. The development costs of the 
game - although moderately high compared to the average high-end commercial 
PC game - are marginal when considered in relation to the US Army’s $2.2 billion 
dollar annual recruiting budget. It is estimated that if the game motivates 
approximately an extra 400 recruits to join, then the project would have 
recouped its initial costs (OEMA, 2003). 
I chose the America’s Army game project and community as a site for 
demonstrating the political re-orientation of games theory for its unprecedented 
position at the juncture between military research and popular entertainment, 
and because the large scale of success it has achieved so far will likely 
encourage the development of similar projects aimed at video game popular 
culture by other state agencies. Although there has been a long history of 
exchange and collaboration between computer technology industries and 
government/military agencies – and notably the relationship between video 
game technologies and military simulations10 – America’s Army represents the 
first instance of the state production, appropriation, and management of video 
game popular culture in the public domain. 
                                                     
9  
Another argument in support of the America’s Army game project’s targeting of teenage video 
game culture, is that especially PC gamers are likely to be from high-income homes, are already 
familiar with computer technologies, and have a higher than average expectation of university 
study. Also, initial thoughts about going into military professions are most often begun at age 13-
14 years old (RAND/YATS). 
10   
For a comprehensive account of the history of this relationship – see Tim Lenoir and Henry 
Lowood’s “Theaters of War: The Military-Entertainment Complex”, 2003. 
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 Video games culture has become a major global phenomenon since the 
1990s (Herz 1997, Poole 2000) and an immediate critical concern of the 
involvement of state-military production in this field will be with the use of the 
new interactive medium for propaganda, and the societal consequences of the 
increasing partnership between the entertainment and defense industries11. Most 
of the concern has focused on the relationship between Hollywood film and 
television production with the military and the consumption of military themes 
through these popular culture media (Wetta & Curley, 1992; Turner, 2001; Suid, 
2002).  A particular anxiety is the retardation of public debate over issues of war, 
and public sensitivity about the difference between the reality of war and mass-
mediated war imagery . 
This anxiety has been heightened by the current military engagement of 
the United States, and by signs of deepening involvement between the defense 
and entertainment communities in recent years, mainly over simulation 
innovation efforts. The landmark 1997 National Research Council/Department of 
Defense paper “Modeling and Simulation: Linking Entertainment and Defense”12 
proposed a wide ranging initiative to guide the convergence and co-ordination of 
the cultures, human resources, business models, and technological agendas of 
the two communities. The primary motivation was the perception that the 
consumer electronic entertainment sector was greatly outpacing defense 
research in the innovation of simulation  expertise.  This innovation has not only 
been in terms of technology but also in the emergent cultural formations and 
social practices that have developed rapidly in games culture (Herz & Macedonia, 
2002) 
                                                     
11  
For instance, see critical responses to the America’s Army project from the leading US liberal-
left media in “’America’s Army’ Targets Youth” , August 23, 2002, The Nation; and “US Military 
Makes Game of Recruitment: Never has Propaganda Been as Fun as the New Army Video”, June 
27 2002, TomPaine.com. 
12  The NRC committee that produced this paper was chaired by current MOVES director Prof. 
Mike Zyda.  
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 In 1999, one of the most high-profile new institutions associated with this 
initiative, the Institute of Creative Technologies (ICT) was founded at the 
University of Southern California. The ICT was specifically tasked by the US Army 
Simulation & Training Command (STRICOM) to intensify the exchange of both 
technical and cultural expertise between the military and the entertainment 
industry. Other US government agencies with active interests and initiatives in 
this convergence include the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO), 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the intelligence 
agencies.  
It is important to note here that the OEMA/MOVES production of 
America’s Army has an institutional history and design rationale quite different 
from the several video game projects created out of arrangements between 
commercial game developers and STRICOM and/or the ICT13. The STRICOM/ICT 
game projects were created with the primary purpose of enhancing military 
training and simulation abilities. From the military perspective, the commercial 
game spin-offs are just an incentive to the corporate game developer partners 
(these are typically heavily modified in order to exclude classified data, to make 
the games more entertaining and less realistic, and even alter the thematic 
atmosphere for marketability).   
The OEMA/MOVES America’s Army project whilst employing veteran 
commercial game developers is entirely an Army-directed and funded project 
rather than a military-corporate partnership. And furthermore, particularly with 
the political sensitivity of the game violence debate, OEMA has placed great 
emphasis that the game is not for simulation or training purposes, and should be 
 11
                                                     
13  
Examples of these collaborations date back to at least the 1980 Atari arcade tank game 
Battlezone which was adapted as an Infantry Fighting Vehicle simulator. An important example of 
the adaptation of commercial FPS software was the 1990s US Marines directive which allowed 
the modification of the game Doom to produce more realistic level fro training purposes. Current 
examples of STRICOM/ICT collaborations with commercial video game developers include the 
platoon leader tactical simulation Full Spectrum Warrior and the infantry company command 
game Full Spectrum Command  (see http://www.ict.usc.edu). For a comprehensive overview of 
 
 
 regarded as a strategic communication initiative that embraces an increasingly 
important part of American youth popular culture. It is notable too that 
OEMA’s14 defining institutional mission was to provide independent economic 
statistical and analytical counsel to the broad range of Army initiatives. Past 
OEMA projects have been to give economic advisory on manpower management, 
the effectiveness of counter-drug operations, and the impact of base closures. 
The conception, design, and production of America’s Army game, the brainchild 
of the current OEMA director, Col. Casey Wardynski, represents an 
unprecedentedly ambitious initiative for OEMA. The game project significantly 
raises OEMA’s profile within the military community, having become one of the 
most important marketing and cost-effective marketing intiatives for US Army 
Recruiting Command (OEMA, 2003). OEMA’s entrepreneurial success of 
leveraging video game popular culture, and enhancing its identity and prestige, 
has encouraged other military and intelligence agencies to take interest in video 
game projects.   
 
Thesis Focus  
The focus of this thesis will be how we might assess the particular new 
military media technology in question, America’s Army the video game, as a 
potential internet-based public sphere. 
The guiding question will be what are limits and advantages of 
understanding the America’s Army game community as a potential public sphere, 
one which is rooted in civilian-military relations. And furthermore, what 
modifications to the Habermasian normative public sphere model will this 
question suggest, when considering the future of state-produced video game 
culture?  
                                                                                                                                                              
current US military collaborations with video game developers, see the website 
www.dodgamecommunity.com . 
14  
OEMA was founded in 1983 within the Department of Social Sciences at the United States 
Military Academy. 
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  The America’s Army project is an especially rich site to consider the 
question of gamer culture as public sphere due to its unique situation within a 
matrix of state authority, military expertise, entertainment technology, and 
consumer marketing practices. The current exceptionalism of America’s Army 
should be taken as a harbinger of future trends of state involvement in mass 
interactive entertainment culture, and as such, it is an important site for forward-
looking political analyses that do not begin with the knee-jerk condemnation of 
military enterprises and/or of the entertainment industry in mind. 
In this paper, I will critically examine the potential of the “gamespace” of 
the America’s Army project to serve as a public sphere in general terms, and also 
specifically regarding the specialized question of US civilian-military relations and 
its part in contermporary democracy.  This examination will first assess the 
official rationale underlying the project, the gameplay experience itself, and the 
official America’s Army player community. I will then expand the assessment to a 
number of exceptional cases of America’s Army player communities that reside in 
the unofficial gamespace. A general outline of these communities is detailed 
below in the methodological notes. 
 
Methodological Notes 
America’s Army Communities and Clans studied 
Note that the real life military America’s Army gamer communities prefer to be 
referred to as “battalion”, “unit”, or other military terms so as to distinguish their 
identity from civilian gamer groups which are generally known as “clans”. 
 
Drunks with Guns 
http://www.madmodders.com/dwg/aao/index.html
 
A typical casual gamer clan, fairly active in tournament competitive play.  
Around 20 active members. 
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1st Veterans Battalion – “Serving Those Who Served” 
http://www.1st-vets.org
 
largest real-life military America’s Army community, comprising of over 700 
members.  95+% military-civilian ratio. About 20% of the clan membership is 
non-US. 
 
Joint Task Force  - “An Online Military Gaming Community” 
http://www.jointtaskforce.net
Around 30 core or senior members. Preserves 90/10% military-civilian ratio.. 
 
Men of God International  
http://www.menofgod.us
A Evangelical Christian gamer community dedicated to missionary work on a 
number of online commercial gamespaces. Around 500 members. 
 
evilhack 
http://evilhack.sourceforge.net
A hacker community, dedicated to creating hacks of America’s Army for general 
circulation. Hosted on the open-source programming community, 
sourceforge.net.  3 core members. 
Interviewees 
 Around 20 interviews were conducted with players of various America’s 
Army clans. Each interview – sometimes done over several sessions - lasted 
between 2 and 6 hours, depending on the interviewee’s willingness to commit 
time. In the following section, I will make reference to 10 of the interviewees, 
who provided the interview material most pertinent to the issues considered in 
this thesis. For the sake of confidentiality, I will be identifying these persons by 
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 their clan identifier and the initial of their America’s Army game identity.  All 
these interviewees are avid America’s Army gameplayers, having regularly spent 
between 20 and 40 (or more) hours a week playing the game or otherwise 
engaged in America’s Army game community activity.  
 In addition, together with the military community ethnographer, Sharon 
Ghamari-Tabrizi, I interviewed several Army officers in charge of the game 
project at the United States Military Academy at West Point. These sessions were 
face-to-face, lasted several hours each. Interview transcripts and other data 
obtained were subjected to Army review over the inclusion of extracted 
materials, but not their interpretation. No extracts proposed for inclusion in this 
paper were refused. 
 Note that many interviewees specifically requested that I correct 
misspellings, typographical errors, and profane language that occurred during 
the casual flow of online interview. For consistency, I have corrected spellings 
etc. for all interviewees.  
 Brief biographies for these player interviewees are listed below. I asked 
the interviewees to give as much biographical data about themselves as they 
were comfortable with – in the case of the evilhack hacker community, this was 
rather less than the others. All interviewees were male and aged between 20 
and 40 years of age (the America’s Army gamer community and FPS 
communities in general being overwhelmingly male).  
 
1st Veteran’s Battalion 
(1VB) B. in his late 20s. Currently in Maine. Active duty Army Captain, Air 
Defense. Currently assigned as ROTC cadre and studying at Army college for 
Master’s degree in Healthcare Administration.  
(1VB) H. in his 20s. Active duty US Army (based in Germany). Infantry Company 
Master Gunner. Deployed in Gulf War 2. 
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 (1VB) P. In his 30s. Lives in Chicago. Acting leader of 1VB while 1VB commander 
was deployed with 3rd Infantry Division in Middle East. Signed up for military 
career route at 12 years old on high school program. Served in the 10th Mountain 
Division. Invalided out due to paradrop accident during Airborne training. 
(1VB) S. early 30s. Former USMC air defense. Served in the first Gulf War. 
Currently a civilian English teacher.  
 
Joint Task Force 
(JTF) C. parent of 4, in his 30s. Self-described as “very Southern”, brought up in 
Tennesee. Grew up as an “airforce brat”.  Served in the US Army military police 
in S. Korea. Married fellow MP. Now a civilian firefighter. 
(JTF) W. late 20s. Founder and leader of JTF community. Active duty Joint 
Services satellite communications officer and force protection instructor. 9th year 
in the military. From a strong military family background (around 20 relatives in 
armed forces or DoD civilian bureaucracy). 
 
Men of God International15
(none)  
 
Drunks With Guns 
(DWG) K. – 26 years old, home in Ohio. Left railroad engineer job to enlist in US 
Army in 2003.  
                                                     
15  
Note that the pronounced wariness of the Men of God Christian Evangelist clan to outside 
scrutiny led to their refusal of my request for permission to seek interview candidates on their 
website forums.  
(This was the only game community to do so – Joint Task Force sought public affairs clearance 
first from the military, but were thereafter extremely open to inquiry).  
Men of God nominated a member of their clan – a professor of New Testament Studies – whom 
they thought would be most able with dealing with their political sensitivities in engaging with me 
as their official spokesman (and my only MoG interviewee). Unfortunately, unexpected (and still 
inexplicable) circumstances led to the withdrawal of the interviewee mid-session.  
Consequently, I deemed that interview data unusable for research.  
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 (DWG) S. – 24 years old, based in Florida.  Self-described “geek” programmer 
with “strong computer background”. Enthusiastic FPS player since high school. 
 
evilhack.sourceforge.net 
(eh) E.  23 year old founder of evilhack (unknown country – possibly European?) 
- began programming when 10 years old. Started own computer company after 
11th grade. 
(eh) H. – in his 20s. Core member of evilhack hacker group. Canadian coder – 
interested in programming and hacking since 13 years old. Describes himself 
now as “just a typical geek with a wife and a job”. 
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CHAPTER 1: Theoretical Framework – 
The Public Sphere and US Civilian-Military Relations 
 
 In this chapter, I first outline Habermas’ theory of the public sphere, its 
role in contemporary democracy, and the potential of its revitalization through 
internet technologies. I then place US civilian-military relations in the context of 
this analytical framework of Habermasian theory, and explore the potential of 
online video game communities as a public sphere and the unique significance of 
the America’s Army project as the first state-produced video game popular 
culture space. 
 
Habermas’ Conception of the Public Sphere 
 Since the 1962 publication of The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere, Jurgen Habermas' conception of "the public sphere" - the independent 
space of reasoned debate and opinion in a liberal democracy - has had a very 
generative influence on political discourse and a broad range of intellectual 
disciplines internationally. In the years after the original publication of The 
Structural Transformation, Habermas has revised and improved his 
understanding of the public sphere numerous times in response to critiques. 
 Habermas' analysis situated the emergence of the public sphere 
historically as a new space in the 18th century Enlightenment context of the 
socio-economic rise of the bourgeois class. With their increasing leisure time and 
economic interests, the social importance of salons and coffeehouses grew as 
centers for deliberating and organizing public consensus in political affairs. This 
bourgeois public sphere achieved institutionalization through democratic 
constitutional reforms that guaranteed basic political rights such as freedom of 
speech, an independent judiciary, and equal civil rights. Within the public sphere, 
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 opinion on matters of public interest and concern could be expressed and 
debated, on a face-to-face basis, independent of economic concerns and social 
pressures, and a democratically legitimate public consensus could be authorized 
through the four fundamental norms of the space. Firstly, there was assumed to 
be a basic parity amongst all the participants in the public space, so that the 
authority of social status was overruled by the better rational argument, and 
there was no coercion. Secondly, new topics of critical inquiry and debate were 
opened up as the space itself produced culture for consumption. Thirdly, the 
public sphere space was, at least in principle, open and inclusive for everyone. 
From these three underlying assumptions about the abstract structuring of the 
public sphere, Habermas argued that these enabled the fourth characteristic and 
main function - the public use of reason, mediating between the private spheres 
of everyday civil society (the workplace and the family), and the domain of the 
state. 
 Habermas' original conception was not a celebration of contemporary 
democracy, but rather intended as a warning about the long-term decline of the 
public sphere since the 19th century under the pressure of industrial capitalism, 
technological advancement and the expansion of technocratic bureaucracy. The 
warning was a call for public intellectuals to focus on its reconstruction. This 
decline marked a dangerous crisis of state legitimation, with citizens increasingly 
alienated from their democratic rights and institutions. In this view, the critical 
and deliberative reasoning based on communicative action (that is, the 
negotiation of mutual understanding, and the generation of constructive social 
relations between individuals) that underwrites the emancipatory political 
promise of Enlightenment progress is displaced by increasing elaboration of 
technical and instrumental reason as a means of enhancing power in a 
technologically and economically complex mass society. In Habermas' later 
writings, this consensual or "communicative" reasoning is understood as 
immanent in "the lifeworld" - that is, the world through which we share concrete 
 19 
 
 
 lived experience with others, which forms the basis for mutual understanding. 
This lifeworld community of shared understandings that are taken for granted is 
the essential normative structure of the public sphere – that is, the spatial-
temporal arena where communicative reasoning takes place. 
 But as advanced technological capitalism developed, there was an 
increasing trend towards "the colonization of the lifeworld by systems". Systems 
are understood as social power structures which are dependent upon 
instrumental and functional quantitative rationality (with "steering imperatives" 
such as financial and electoral power). Thus, for instance, the policy satisfaction 
of corporate interests increasingly overrides civil rights concerns. Although the 
legitimation by instrumental rationalities may be immediately more powerful, 
they ultimately depend on the lifeworld-based authority of cultural values. In 
Habermas’ analysis, a fundamental crisis of society arises, when the lifeworld 
and its capacity to support rational communication have been so weakened by 
systems that they can no longer generate sufficient democratic legitimation. This 
weakening leads to the growth of quantitative instrumental processes for 
claiming consensual legitimation in contemporary capitalist democracies. 
Habermas’ term for these processes is “publicity” for corporate and 
governmental interests i.e. political consultancy, marketing and branding, 
electoral polling, and other techniques which give the appearance of a public 
without necessarily contributing to the actual communicative activity of 
democracy - what Habermas terms as "publicity", the product of large-scale 
corporate and governmental production of media.  
 In contrast to the mass-scale and technical character of “publicity”, the 
notion of communicative action is based upon the critical rational potential 
inherent in everyday interactions between individuals. In a 1992 essay, “Further 
Reflections on the Public Sphere”, Habermas contrasts "the communicative 
generation of legitimate power on the one hand" with "the manipulative 
deployment of media power to procure mass loyalty, consumer demand, and 
'compliance' with systemic imperatives on the other" (1992: 452).  
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Criticisms of The Public Sphere concept 
 Much of the criticism of the Habermas' theory of the public sphere has 
centered on what is variously regarded as the utopian or ideal-type character of 
his conception which obscures the exclusion and silencing of non-hegemonic 
voices. The model is historically inaccurate in its emphasis on the achievement of 
consensus – there is an insufficient appreciation of the role of the historical 
struggle of interests, world-views, and power in Habermas' model.  Moreover, 
this public sphere ideal presents itself as tolerant, diverse, populist, and open, 
when historically it has been dominated by wealthy white males. Habermas has 
been criticized for his neglect of ethnicity, gender, and the working-class, and 
the history of their counter-public spheres which developed to express political 
communities outside of the bourgeois sphere (Negt & Kluge, 1972). It has also 
been argued that Habermas' emphasis on a public sphere which makes universal 
claims of representation, and takes the formation of public consensus as a goal 
has little relevance to the cultural reality of advanced complex societies where 
there not only an increasing plurality of interests, but increasing heterogeneity of 
cultural lifeworlds, particularly with what postmodernists such as Jean-François 
Lyotard understand as the breakdown of the traditional legitimation authority of 
metanarratives which claimed a fundamental, overarching cultural lifeworld for 
everyone (Lyotard, 1984). In this perspective, it has been suggested that it is 
more productive to think in terms of a multiplicity of lifeworlds, and consequently 
of public spheres. This is also to account for the context of advanced complex 
societies which are dependent on relations of dominance and subordination, 
where is neither possible to aspire to universal parity in a truly non-coercive, 
consensual situation (Fraser,1989).  
 These specific political critiques of Habermas' Enlightenment political 
project have influenced his later development of his framework toward the less 
teleological and prescriptive, but also ahistorical and essentialist theory of 
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 communicative action. This shift marks Habermas' repudiation of his economic 
analysis in favor of a cognitivist theory of rational communication.  The basis for 
the public sphere is understood now to be rooted in the inherent qualities of 
language and cognition rather than a concern with the materiality of socio-
economic life, such as labor. This "discourse-centered concept of democracy" 
understands the process of public deliberation as one which does not directly 
exercise power but only influences government.  
 From the post-structuralist and constructivist perspective (in which 
language is regarded as socio-historically constructed and the primary site in 
which power struggles take place), Habermas' cognitivist model is utopian, and 
ignores the manipulation of language in the interests of domination. This 
oversight makes the model particularly vulnerable in the contemporary age of 
information technologies and communication sciences, where information (the 
quantification and codification of communication) has also become a key 
constituent of technical-instrumental power. As N. Katherine Hayles has argued, 
“Given market forces already at work, it is virtually… certain that we will 
increasingly live, work, and play in environments that construct us as embodied 
virtualities”. The consequence of this trend is that information is increasingly 
regarded as a master site and abstract constituent of power to such an extent 
that the cultural perception of the relationship between technology and ontology 
today is that “material objects are interpenetrated by information patterns” 
(1999:48-49, 69). However, at the same time, the notion of information and 
communication technology proliferation being a primary site of power also 
suggests that the discourse-centered notion of the public sphere bears more 
substantive potential today.  
 
The Internet as a Public Sphere 
 The information revolution at the end of the 20th century, and the new 
socio-cultural formations that have emerged in its wake, has been widely hailed 
by technology enthusiasts as the opportunity for the resurgence of public sphere 
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 activity in the technologically advanced countries. Leading information 
technology advocates in the United States, such as Howard Rheingold (1993) 
and Esther Dyson (1994) and politicians such as Al Gore and Newt Gingrich, 
made much of the promise of the new cultural activities of networked computer 
infrastructure during the 1990s - a notion which became widespread amongst 
expert and academic, as well as popular discourses (Fernback & Thompson, 
1995). For instance, Douglas Kellner (1998) has argued that the Internet has 
“produced new public spheres and spaces for information, debate, and 
participation that contain the potential to invigorate democracy and to increase 
the dissemination of critical and progressive ideas.” 
 Habermas himself has allowed for some of the modifications to his ideal-
type model that was needed to endorse the idea of a virtual, networked public 
sphere as a democratic solution to mass society: “if there still is to be a realistic 
application of the idea of the sovereignty of the people to highly complex 
societies, it must be uncoupled from the concrete understanding of its 
embodiment in the physically present, participating, and jointly deciding 
members of a collectivity.” (1992:451) He later argues: "the phenomenon of a 
world public sphere [is now] becoming politically reality for the first time in a 
cosmopolitan matrix of communication" (1996:514). For the enthusiasts, the new 
information technologies appeared to fit all the normative requirements for the 
ideal-type public sphere model. The proliferation of these technologies were 
regarded as potentially allowing universal access to a decentralized anti-
hierarchical medium of uncoerced communication outside traditional political 
spaces.  Participants in these discursive spaces interact informally, safely, and 
shorn of physical status markers when generating discussion and the exchange 
of opinions on myriad topics through such technologies as online chat, text-
based multiple user dimensions (MUDs), and website bulletin boards. At the 
same time, this widespread championing of the internet as a public sphere was 
met with numerous criticisms of internet-based discourse that claimed that the 
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 novel conditions of computer mediated communication (CMC) within cyberspace 
were too immaterial and constituted an impoverished, discordant form of public 
communication. 
 The ongoing evaluation of internet CMC as the basis for revitalizing the 
public sphere is based upon both the interrogation of the new forms and spaces 
of communication that upholds the prerequisites for democratic critical rationality 
according to the normative Habermasian framing, and the drive to further evolve 
this framing to the new social dimensions and complexities of CMC. Leaving 
aside the broader debate on what ought to constitute the deliberative democratic 
ideal of public reasoning (whilst acknowledging the evolved state of late 
Habermasian theory) the specific idealized normative conditions by which we can 
test the potential of any given case of CMC might be set out as so: 
   
i.                Autonomy from state and economic power. 
ii.               Exchange and critique of moral-practical validity claims i.e. is the  
content of the discourse non-trivial for the function of public 
reasoning?  
iii.  Reflexivity i.e. public discourse participants have critical awareness  
of their own values, assumptions, and interests, as cast against the 
broader social context; this awareness includes attempting to 
empathize with alternative viewpoints. 
iv.   Sincerity and honesty of the participants’ communications and 
 attempts at understanding one another. 
v.               Discursive inclusion and equality within a shared communicative  
 framework (common system/lifeworld experiences) 
         (adapted from Dahlberg, 2001)  
 
 In the next chapter, I first argue for the significance of America’s Army as a 
serious political project and then emphasize its relevance to the discussion of 
revitalizing the contemporary US public sphere and the specific issue of civilian-
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 military relations. I then examine the three most prominent manifestations of the 
America’s Army video game within the framing of the evolved normative 
Habermasian theory of the public sphere and the criticisms of the notion of the 
Internet as a public sphere. These three manifestations are the video game 
itself, the official US Army rationale underlying the game, and the general 
character of the game player discourse on the heavily frequented public forums 
of the official americasarmy.com website. I will test the public sphere potential of 
these manifestations (which represent the formal and normative contexts of the 
America’s Army project) against the five ideal-type conditions stated above. 
Through this exercise I will identify key questions corresponding to those specific 
critiques of internet age public sphere theory which seem most pressing when 
considering the particular potentials and limits of this video game space as a 
democratic medium. 
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Chapter 2:   The Limits and Potentials of America’s Army   
   as a Video Game Public Sphere 
  
America’s Army as a Serious Political Video Game 
 A key basis for our understanding of the potential of video game culture 
as a space for public sphere generation is the argument against the trivialization 
of video games which is a dominant tone in mainstream perceptions of the 
medium. I argue here that there is an important trend of “serious” political 
games emerging, of which America’s Army is one of the most prominent. 
 Gonzalo Frasca16, one of the more prominent voices today in the nascent 
discourse of humanities video game theory, writes that: “So, where should we 
go if we are looking for ‘serious’ computer games? As far as we know, nowhere. 
The reason is simple: there is an absolute lack of ‘seriousness’ in the computer 
game industry…. The reasons are probably mainly economical” (2000). Frasca 
defines “serious” games in the strong sense as those which are designed to have 
a influence on the player regarding important issues of political public interest. 
He also contends that these are very unlikely to emerge in the current 
mainstream conditions of the games industry, which like many, he regards as 
purely preoccupied with a commodity logic of escapist entertainment. 
Furthermore, Frasca argues that besides the inappropriateness of gravely treated 
political issues as a theme for a commercial game, there are structural 
conventions of mainstream game design that undermine and trivialize any moral 
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 significance. The reality of life and death is not only trivialized by the binary win-
lose logic of video games, he argues, but also by the replayability inherent in the 
video game medium. Consequently, the ergodic representation of political ethics 
is easily perverted by how typical game conventions free the player from moral 
responsibilities as grounded in permanent, non-trivial consequences, and cause 
the life-and-death bases of political discourse to lose their reflective value. 
 I would argue that, on the contrary, there is an emerging and increasingly 
influential trend of “serious” games with a political agenda in the “strong” sense. 
That these “serious” games are being conceived and produced most significantly 
by the intersection between the state and the electronic entertainment industry 
in the United States, for the interests of simulation, training, and public 
communication. The more urgent question, in my view, is not whether video 
game designers can create successful “serious” games for the mass market, but 
rather, one that concerns the public intellectual agenda of games theory itself, 
especially as re-oriented towards engaging the unprecedented emergence of 
state-produced popular game culture17 of which America’s Army the video game 
is the current leading example. And furthermore, I am arguing that games like 
America’s Army, regardless whether one regards the project as a vital strategic 
communication tool or objectionable propaganda (or somewhere in between) is 
in fact a “serious” game in the strong sense of the political – of actually having a 
substantive impact on real world political discourse over the gravest public 
issues. 
 It is inadequate to analyze video game culture and industry as detached 
from “real-world” issues; in part, this would be to collude with the fantasy of 
commodified escapist leisure itself, and also ignores the material reality and 
                                                                                                                                                              
16   
Gonzalo Frasca runs the popular video game theory website, www.ludology.org 
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 physical spatiality of video game production and consumption. But these still 
might be understood as largely parochial concerns. The stronger argument for 
the broader political relevance of video game discourse is its status as a leading 
domain in which the integration and convergence of virtual and non-virtual social 
phenomena is taking place. The trend is now distinguished enough for legal 
experts such as the authors of a recent article in the prominent US Legal Affairs 
magazine to argue that: “It is important to understand what role law is playing – 
and should play – in virtual worlds. Over the next few years, increasing numbers 
of communities will come to exist in virtual worlds and real-world economies will 
continue to bleed into their virtual counterparts.” (Hunter & Lastowska 2003)18. 
Examples of this “bleeding” include the real-world sale of virtual objects and 
avatars created by players in game-worlds. A trend of leakage in the opposite 
direction – from game-world to real-world – is also evident, for instance, in the 
influence of MMORPG clan rivalries on real-world gang violence in South Korea19.  
 However, the social constructs and communications enacted within (and 
thereby constituting) virtual game-worlds still generally have a displaced 
relationship to the materiality real world society (and so the public sphere). The 
relationship is primarily one of representation, reenactment, and communication. 
The leakages between game-world and real-world are primarily one of symbolic 
rather than material worth. The uniqueness of the America’s Army game and its 
community, and its significance as a harbinger of future state production of mass 
interactive entertainment, is that the direct linkage with real world materiality 
                                                                                                                                                              
17  
 The Serious Games Workshop funded by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation is one example of 
a civilian thinktank dedicated to enhancing governance and policy discussion through video 
games  (www.seriousgames.org). 
18   see Edward Castronova’s landmark paper, “Virtual Worlds: A First-hand Account of Market 
and Society on the Cyberian Frontier” (2001). This paper analyzes the economy of Everquest in 
real-world terms and is reportedly the most downloaded paper on the Social Sciences Research 
Network database. IT been cited by former US Undersecretary of State for Commerce, Robert 
Shapiro, as evidence of the potential usefulness of these game-worlds for producing insights into 
real-world economic policy and social philosophy (Shapiro 2003).   
19 
 “Where does the fantasy end?”, Time magazine, June 4 2001 
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 goes well beyond the internal game-world sociality or the consumption networks 
of technology and commerce.  The America’s Army game integrates video game 
culture with real world politics in the most fundamental and serious way possible 
– that is, the material and moral support of the legitimate use of violence, or 
what Max Weber famously defined as the most basic political exercise and 
special right of the state. This is not simply the use of political drama as a 
compelling game theme, or the simulation of real world problems as a site of 
training and experimentation, or the creation of games specifically for critical 
comment20.  
 It is in this way that America’s Army can be understood as a “serious” 
game in the strongest political sense. The game project is not simply one of 
ideological communication – be it understood as marketing or propaganda - but 
one designed with specific real-world moral and political effects in direct support 
of legitimate violence in the name of national security and defending democratic 
rights. These strong political claims can be seen, for instance, in the slogans 
used in the America’s Army marketing campaign21. The campaign’s main tagline 
“The Official U.S. Army Game – Defend Freedom, Empower Yourself” speaks of 
both the military institution’s ideological claims of not only being tasked with the 
protection of core humanist values (a society based on the freedoms of the 
individual), but that in the process of training recruits, the potential and abilities 
of that individual to affirm and develop himself is enhanced. 
                                                     
20  such as the spate of amateur-produced small online Shockwave and Flash games in the wake 
of 9/11 and the Afghanistan campaign which offered emotional release or raised questions about 
the conduct of military operations . For examples, see “Online games are the newest form of 
social commentary”, August 29, 2002, Slate.com. http://slate.msn.com/id/2070197/ 
21  
notably, the America’s Army brand was developed as a  separate identity from the U.S. Army 
brand   (which has its own established marketing group). This decision was made in part to 
create distance between the entertainment/pop culture brand and the real military organization. 
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  A clearer, more specific message is found in the video trailers produced to 
advertise the Special Forces missions due for release in 2003.  The imagery in 
the videos intercuts gameplay scenes from America’s Army with real film footage 
of American soldiers in action (at least some of the scenes appear to be from 
Iraq and/or the 2002 Afghanistan campaign). And the in-trailer narratives 
emphasize the moral mission of the US Army, and the key role played by US 
Special Forces, in both the “War on Terror” and Operation Iraqi Freedom:  
“the threats to freedom do not sleep... the threats to freedom know no 
boundaries... neither do the protectors of freedom... the Army’s Special 
Forces who defend what is best... and confront those who seek to oppress” 
and: 
“As long as there are forces which threaten the promise of freedom.. 
America's Army stands ready... and in the vanguard you will find... Special 
Forces [...] help liberate the oppressed... become one of the Army's Green 
Berets... and subdue the enemies of freedom” 
 
  One widely-read and enthusiastic championing of the America’s Army 
project in terms of muscular political humanism was written by the video games 
correspondent for the liberal-leaning US online journal Salon.com, Wagner James 
Au.  He writes: 
 
“Though not explicitly doctrinaire in an ideological sense, by showing the 
very young how we fight, applying the moral application of lethal force on behalf 
of liberal values, [America’s Army] create[s] the wartime culture which is so 
desperately needed now. […] You can see them in the field, in subsequent 
years, dedicated young men and women, their weapons merged into an 
information network that enables them to cut out with surgical precision the 
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 cancer that threatens us all – heat-packing humanitarians who leave the 
innocent unscathed, and full of renewed hope.”22 
  
 Also worth quoting here is an extract from an earlier 2002 Salon.com 
article by Au, “Playing Games with Free Speech”, which criticizes that year’s St. 
Louis federal court ruling (overturned in 2003) that video games are too trivial in 
subject matter to be afforded First Amendment protection. Au opens his 
argument in favor of video games being treated as significant social expression 
by reflecting on his experience of the Omaha Beach level of the commercial 
Second World War FPS, Medal of Honor: Allied Assault  (Electronic Arts, 2002). 
This level was designed to aspire to an ergodic cinematic realism modeled after 
the opening D-Day landing scene of the Steven Spielberg film, Saving Private 
Ryan (1998):  
“Saving democracy means having to wade toward the shore, while 
fascists unload hell on you from the beachhead. Which means you usually get 
killed. But you make that run, again and again, because the goal is worth all 
those lives you lose in the churning sea. […] It’s a common conceit in games: 
play, die, reload, and ride the karmic wheel of kick-ass, until you get it right. But 
what ‘Allied Assault’s’ developers have done is use this feature to express an 
explicit point about World War II, and what it took to win it.”   
  
 In this extract from the earlier article, Au turns Frasca’s primary objection 
to the potential of commercial video games to invoke contemplation of serious 
issues on its head – the ability to replay the level even after virtual death, 
becomes a moment of empathy for what it meant to actually storm Omaha 
Beach. For Au, the perspective shifts from the notion of the resurrectable 
individual (who is comically or trivially immune to permanent death) to that of 
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22  Au, “Weapons of Mass Distraction”, Salon.com, October 4 2002. 
 
 
 the mortality of a single soldier who is interchangable with a mass others – a 
logic which is equivalent to that of real military organization and the moral 
legitimation of war23. The ergodic replayability of virtual death on the virtual 
beachhead here, rather than trivalizing history, instead pays tribute to the 
memory of the real deaths of D-Day soldiers which are relatively trivial (and 
therefore a worthwhile sacrifice) compared to the greater cause at stake (“saving 
democracy”). Au’s enthusiastic account of the potential of America’s Army is 
marked by a shift in perspective that connects the game experience not with real 
history but the conflict reality of the present day and the future – that today’s 
players are of the generation who will apply their interactive virtuosity in the 
name of lethal liberalism and the “heat-packing humanitarianism” of tomorrow.   
Both Au and the video games scholar, Nina Huntemann (2003), directly 
compare the America’s Army project with the Why We Fight war films made by 
Hollywood directors such as Frank Capra in the 1940s – and both  comment that 
the interactive character of the video games medium makes the game’s message 
more like “How We Fight” . But Huntemann uses this comparison to make a 
point quite contrary to Au’s: 
 
“[games like America’s Army] are sort of like the Why We Fight films, 
except they’ve morphed into ‘how we fight’ video games, which takes away from 
a lot of the other ‘why’ questions, and all the moral questions that are connected 
                                                                                                                                                              
www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/10/04/why_we_fight 
23  
As the video games theorist Steven Poole writes: “We are used to thinking of ‘life’ as a single, 
sacred thing, the totality of our experiences. But videogames redefine a ‘life’ as a part of a larger 
campaign. In part this resembles the brutal calculus of war” (2000:68). A most enthusiastic 
proponent of the idea that video game playing must be understood as a positive and deep 
cultural practice, Poole admits that his one serious reservation about video games is that “if a 
modern pilot has been trained on supped-up videogame systems, we should not be surprised 
if…. [h]e fails utterly to realize that his actions [in real combat] now have a moral content” and 
that it will be “a lethal failure of the imagination” if video games culture does not develop a 
strong sense of moral responsibility over this concern. (238-9). 
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 to that…. [These games are]… a kind of ‘shock and awe’24 display of what the 
American military is capable of, without the consequences of context. That is 
seductive.”  
  
 Huntemann’s critique of America’s Army (and other realistic war-themed 
games) assumes that the pleasure and hence the influence of these games 
comes primarily from the feelings of glamour and power of enacting virtual 
technologically-augmented violence – and that this reduces the game experience 
of war to the dehumanizing seductiveness of technology. But Au’s account – 
despite its uncritical grandstanding – has the clearer understanding of how, as 
an official marketing/strategic communication tool of the US Army, America’s 
Army is precisely concerned with how the “how we fight” is bound intimately up 
with the “why”. The moral emphasis is there regardless of whether one sees this 
more as the proper assertion of honorable army values in the cause of 
humanistic politics or more as the careful fashioning of on-message ideology and 
branding. 
 
America’s Army in the context of Civilian-Military Relations 
 If we take its political significance seriously, can the America’s Army video 
game space be thought of as having potential to help “save democracy”? In 
terms of the civil society problems of the public sphere, the most direct and 
obvious relevance of the game and its communities would be to the discussion of 
war and the domestic American question of US civilian-military relations. How 
                                                     
24 
  Interestingly, an early controversy of Gulf War 2 was the revelation that Sony Computer 
Entertainment USA had applied for the entertainment media rights for the name “Shock and 
Awe”, the day after the US military’s actual officially named “Shock and Awe” air bombardment 
operation in Baghdad. Sony quickly retracted the application in the face of a general outcry, and 
made a public apology – which might be said, demonstrates both the immediate commercial 
seductiveness of war as a theme for games developers and also that there is still a palpable 
ethical difference between media spectacles of violence for political purposes and those for 
entertainment. 
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 does of the America’s Army project’s influence on American civilian society look 
in the Habermasian framing? 
 As an Army center for economic analysis, OEMA – the institutional 
originators of the America’s Army video game project – can immediately be 
thought of as very much an instrumental-technical function of US Army 
bureaucracy25.  The orientation of the game project towards inserting a conduit 
for increased public awareness and appreciation of the Army into a major sector 
of popular culture, could be thought of in Habermasian terms as the 
encroachment of systems in a lifeworld already substantially colonized by the 
money-orientated systems of the commercial entertainment industry, However, 
in the specific historical context of miliary-civilian relations in the United States, it 
is misleading to think of the US Army primarily in terms of its instrumental 
rationaliy of power and self-interest, as we might a corporation. At least 
formally, the institutional authority of the US Army rests on its moral and cultural 
distinctiveness from the self-interested liberal-capitalist ideology of American 
civilian society. As such, in basic Habermasian terms, the encroachment of 
targeted marketing innovations into popular culture for the purposes of 
improving the brand image and labor market profile of the Army is not simply a 
calculated instrumental function of publicity, but also a window between two 
distinct lifeworlds – a channel for inter-community relations which addresses the 
long-standing problem of the post-Vietnam “civilian-military gap” in US society. 
 In a keynote speech given at Yale University in 1997, US Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen expressed concern over "a chasm... developing between 
the military and civilian worlds" that was creating a climate of mutual distrust 
and resentment. This idea of the "civilian-military culture gap" has been a 
perennial issue for debates over the relationship between American national 
security and civil society (Cohn, 1999). There is the fear that estrangement 
between the military and civilian spheres will mean that public culture will not 
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 nurture or support an appropriate or adequate military, and that the military 
community may become alienated from their loyalties to civilian command.  This 
issue dates back to the framing of the US Constitution which was designed to 
protect American democracy from takeover – the Framers divided control of the 
military between three branches of government, and emphasized the importance 
of a citizen-soldier militia rather than dependence on a professional military. 
Traditionally, American public attitudes to the military have been ambivalent, 
influenced by a mainstream culture that values individualism over group 
loyalties, and a distaste for military involvement in politics (Langston, 2000). 
 However, since the end of the draft in 1973, the military has become an all-
volunteer professional force, with increasing focus on technical specialization and 
careerism, due to the demands of technological advances and a reduced 
demographic recruiting base. In the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, 
concerns over differences between the military community and the broader 
public peaked with the collapse of the major external threat to national security. 
The journalist, Thomas Ricks, famously wrote of the extent of the growing 
cultural gap as an extension of the broader American "culture wars" in a 1997 
article for The Atlantic Monthly magazine (1997). Ricks noted the growing 
intensity of contempt amongst military personnel for civilian culture as amoral 
and hedonistic, at the same time as the stature of traditional martial values and 
visibility of the military declined in the mainstream public26. 
 These anxieties were evidence of a trend undermining what the historian 
Samuel P. Huntington in his landmark 1959 book The Soldier and the State 
                                                                                                                                                              
25 
 the major OEMA project before the launch of America’s Army was economic analysis support 
for the recapitalization of the US Army tank fleet.  
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A major comparative survey of military and civilian cultural values in 1999 by the Triangle 
Institute for Security Studies (Feaver & Kohn, 2001) confirmed that military personnel were 
becoming more politically assertive in their views, and that "Military officers express great 
pessimism about the moral health of civilian society and strongly believe that the military could 
help society become more moral, and that civilian society would be better off if it adopted more 
of the military's values and behaviors" whilst the civilian elite was resistant to the idea that the 
military should have greater influence on American society (460). 
 
 
 
 suggested was the normal doctrine of civilian-military relations in the United 
States. Huntington approvingly cites a Command and General Staff College text 
from 1936: "Politics and [military] strategy are radically and fundamentally 
things apart. Strategy begins where politics ends. All that soldiers ask is that 
once the policy is settled, strategy and command shall be regarded as being in a 
sphere apart from politics." (Huntington 1959:308). In Huntington's view - still 
understood as shaping the dominant understanding of the military's relationship 
to civil society in the US defense establishment - the modern military must be 
regarded as a specialized profession distinct and isolated from the mainstream, 
with an unique responsibility and expertise in the "management of violence", 
transcends monetary considerations, and encourages a strong group ethic. As 
Feaver & Kohn (2001:1) argue "Differences in civilian and military are, of course, 
necessary and desirable: even in a society based on civil liberty, personal 
autonomy, and democratic governance, military institutions must subordinate the 
individual to the group, and personal well-being to mission accomplishment." 
Other influential military scholars such as the sociologist Morris Janowtiz (1960) 
have argued that with the advancing complexity of modern society and 
technology, it is crucial that the military maintain sufficient proximity to 
mainstream culture values. That is, the military should become increasingly more 
democratic in outlook if a relationship of trust is to be maintained – particularly 
if, as in recent years, the professionalization of the military actually has lead to a 
less robust concern with political detachment from the public sphere.  
 But at the same time, there are those military experts who argue that the 
gap is overstated and that "the military... remains highly salient, as a central 
institution affecting our material well-being and active in contemporary projects 
to constitute what we think is a good and secure society". That is, the military - 
with its large slice of the national budget, and its one-and-a-half million 
personnel force - both acts as significant material actor in society, and a moral 
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 actor in the establishment of the social norms (Burk, in Feaver & Kohn 
2001:248).  
 In the analytical framework of Habermas' conceptions of public sphere 
and communicative action, I would suggest that the US military represents an 
important institution and sector of American democracy that should be thought 
of as a self-conflicted combination of system and lifeworld, rather than 
Habermas' oversimplistic dualism of lifeworld vs. system. At the same time as 
the formal operational logic of the contemporary US military requires that its 
personnel and structures follow a precise technical-instrumental rationality, the 
nature of the military profession and its ethics requires that a very distinct and 
separate lifeworld of values and ideals27 be maintained for its personnel. In part 
this helps guarantee the Constitutional ideal that separate civilian command is 
meant to ensure the subservience of the military system to democratic lifeworld 
values. But this contemporary distinction – the “gap” – also runs against another 
founding principle of the US Constitution. As Elaine Scarry has noted, the Second 
Amendment calls for the general distribution of military power amongst the 
populace – both as a right and a responsibility – and political rights were 
historically seen intertwined with military rights. For instance, as Scarry points 
out, the expansion of political suffrage to minorities, women, and the young in 
the US has been principally justified in terms of the usefulness of these groups in 
wartime (2002). The Constitutional ideal here is that of the citizen-soldier, whose 
cultural experience and political awareness of the military system is fully 
integrated into the normal lifeworld of civilian experience. 
 From this Constitutional perspective, the anxieties about the civilian-
military gap become focused on the problem that the lifeworld production of 
military culture has become so disconnected from the lifeworld of the 
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lifeworld members draw shared expectations about the ordering of social relations, and is also 
the milieu out of which our individual competencies for speech and action (our personalities) are 
formed. 
 
 
 
 mainstream public that the overall democratic legitimacy and rationality of the 
military's system function is threatened. As Morgan (2001) notes, this 
disconnection is not simply due to indoctrination and training but is "the result 
also of physical separation, creating limited military social and community ties. 
Military bases, complete with their own schools, churches, stores, child care 
centers, and recreational areas, can be characterized as never-to-be-left islands 
of tranquility removed from the seemingly chaotic, crime-ridden civilian 
environment outside the gates."28
 The civilian-military relationship based on the citizen-soldier envisioned in 
the Constitution can be thought of in Habermasian term, as the cross-fertilization 
or mutual embedding of military system and civilian lifeworld in such a way that 
the former is subservient to the latter. This isolation of military communities from 
civilian society, in combination with the increasing demands of professionalism 
and technical specialization (which have intensified the “system” qualities of the 
military) makes this relationship ideal seem like a beleaguered concept (Abrams 
& Bacevich, 2001; Cohen, 2001).  
 A major potential of the America’s Army project then, is the reconstruction 
of the relationships between military and civilian communities in a new internet 
space. However, although developing this potential is raised as a key goal for the 
project (OEMA, 2003), this lifeworld integration is not the fundamental official 
rationale for the project, and any potential must be considered in combination 
with the more central economic and communication aims, as well as in the 
distinct context of the expressed moral-ideological identity of the U.S. Army as a 
defender of American freedoms.  
 
The Official Rationale of America’s Army and the Civilian-Military context 
                                                     
28  In his reportage on the experiences of newly trained US Marines, Thomas Ricks noted how 
many of those he followed became alienated not just from civilian life in general, but also from 
close family members and school friends (Ricks, 1997). 
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  To illustrate this combination I draw upon press releases and internal 
Army documents made available to me by OEMA, as well as an interview with 
OEMA head and America’s Army project director, Colonel Casey Wardynski at 
West Point.   The mixture of the instrumental and the moral, of system and 
lifeworld rationalities, can be seen in both the press FAQs prepared by OEMA to 
deal with possible public criticism29 as well as the internal OEMA documents 
which relate the official rationale underlying the project. 
 For Col. Wardynski - the originator and main champion of the America’s 
Army video game concept - the rationale guiding and justifying the US Army can 
be best understood as the dovetailing of the socio-economic changes driven by 
the information revolution with the manpower and skill requirements of the Army 
of the future (known as “the Objective Force” in Army jargon). In terms of 
OEMA’s key mission of supporting the manpower needs analysis of the Army, 
competition for skilled recruits in the labor market is understood as requiring 
institutional adaptation to information age popular culture. As befits the research 
orientation of an economic analysis thinktank, Wardynski notes that the 
fundamental task of the project is in dealing with the basic problematic 
assumption underlying economic analysis of a market economy – that of perfect 
information: 
 
 "Development, marketing and distribution of the America's Army game lie 
at the intersection of technological progress, opportunity and innovation. The 
concept for the Game however found its roots in economic theory. [...] 
economists understand that information [which drives decision-making by 
economic actors] is not perfectly distributed and that indeed, there may be 
considerable search costs. In fact, Daniel Kahneman, the 2002 Nobel Prize 
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29  These FAQs, mainly concerned with the game violence debate and questions concerned with 
the ethical representation of war, were prepared by the Political and Social Science departments 
at USMA, West Point.  
 
 
 
 winner for economics, pointed out that people tend to make decisions based 
upon information in their immediate environment.” (OEMA 2003:1)  
 
 Wardynski was concerned that, in an increasingly dense, diversified, and 
competitive popular culture media environment, the Army was insufficiently 
effective in communicating through its television and film advertising campaigns. 
The new “digital generation” of tech-savvy kids was demonstrating a marked 
trend away from traditional screens to computer-network interactivity, in 
addition to higher expectations for information access. Wardynski noted that: ““if 
kids have stilted information, or no information… the recruiting costs are going 
to go through the roof”. 
  This shift represents an additional strategic communication problem to the 
Army, which had already struggled with the decline of local community and 
family contact between soldiers and civilians (which had been the main 
information source for recruits prior to the post-Vietnam all-volunteer force) and 
the stereotypical and sensationalist representations of the military by Hollywood 
through traditional screens. In terms of information economics, Wardynski 
regards the personnel-intensive structure of the existing Army recruiting offices 
as outdated and cost-ineffective information intermediaries between the Army 
and the public, while the Hollywood representations are external, independent 
intermediaries beyond Army control.  Wardynski explained how he thought the 
video game represented a compelling way of harnessing the cultural status of 
computers to solve these information problems through structural 
disintermediation and disruption (two key concepts of information revolution 
management theory). This would dramatically lower the information search costs 
for recruits:  
 
“The computer’s a tool… I was looking for a medium which would be 
disruptive in nature, and would shift the way people think about communication 
[in Army recruiting]… dramatically shift the effectiveness, shift the costs, shift 
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 the intermediation”, “Computers tend to be persuasive by nature… seen as 
devices that are sort of unbiased… very analytic in nature. Computer’s just sitting 
there… it processes data and dumps out a result. It’s very different from a 
recruiter… that’s the hard sell. The game is very much a different kind of sell.” 
[It represents] “a virtual world where you can separate them from their [real 
world] structure, and take them elsewhere [i.e. the Army] and this gets rid of 
the intermediator problems.”   
  
This borrowing of information age business model terms fits well with the 
Department of Defense’s directive since the end of the Cold War that the military 
reorganize itself according to sound business principles of fiscal efficiency, and 
seek out commercial best practices and management innovations (Lenoir, 
2002:14).  But the basic notion of adapting to the needs of a new information 
technology culture which supports the intensification and purification of free 
market mechanics is also rearticulated in terms of the Army’s formal overarching 
ideology as a premier patriotic institution whose mission is to defend American 
culture. The system rationale of information economics is essentially linked with 
the lifeworld experience of the core American values of market and political 
freedoms. In interview, Wardynski remarked he believed that a free information 
culture “is what will keep [this country] free the longest” and that this 
represented a key strategic advantage over totalitarian organizations and 
cultures where information access and flow are tightly controlled. This free 
information culture is regarded here not simply in technocratic or rationalistic 
terms, but is regarded as a fundamental driver of the American lifeworld that is 
embodied in its individual citizens, who are increasingly empowered with the 
anti-hierarchical, pro-networking effects of information technology proliferation. 
Wardynski noted that “the new generation” of tech-savvy youth should be 
understood as more used to (and therefore demanding of) information access 
and meritocracy, more capable of turning data into information, and would be 
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 instinctively disruptive of traditional organizational orders. Aptitudes related to 
information handling and information culture values are seen as vital to the 
effectiveness of the high-tech, network-centric Army of the future, and young 
American gamers seen as especially proficient in these capabilities30: 
 
"Americans are avid gamers. More importantly, when young Americans enter 
the Army, they will increasingly find that key information will be conveyed via 
computer video displays akin to the graphical interfaces found in games. From 
their gaming experience, these young Americans will be demanding consumers 
of visual information in terms of its presentation and organization. They will, 
however, find the distribution of information via graphical displays normal and 
intuitive." (OEMA 2003:3) 
  
 There is here an ideological, rhetorical, and technical three-way 
translation between domains of information age notions of political freedom of 
speech, computer-enhanced free market economics, and network-centric 
warfare. This pivots upon the new information-adept citizen subject. In 
interview, Wardynski remarked on the congruity between civil society CMC 
discursive practices and the information skill requirements of contemporary 
military environments: 
 
“Our military information tends to arrive in a flood… and it’ll arrive in a flood 
under stressful conditions, and there’ll be a hell of a lot of noise… most of it 
hasn’t been turned into information and it’s still data… and this is a lot like the 
internet… you[’ve] got the Drudge [Report alternative news] page [and] 
chatrooms… a lot of it’s noise, some of it’s information…. How do you filter that? 
What are your tools? What is your facility in doing that? What is your level of 
                                                     
30  One OEMA study of the entering Class of 2006 at the United States Military Academy, West 
Point, indicated that 85% were regular gamers. 
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 comfort? How much load can you bear? Kids who are comfortable with that are 
gonna be real comfortable… with the Army of the future.” 
  
 This translation of information freedom consolidates the ideological and 
technical legitimacy of this Army project when subjected to military and civilian 
oversight. In Habermasian terms, the specific instrumental-technical rationale 
here is not simply a system colonization of the lifeworld politically legitimated 
through the operation of publicity. Rather, the institutional identity of the US 
Army is such that it is formally obliged to stand outside the political space (and 
steering media i.e. economic and political individualism and self-interest) of the 
civil society it is tasked to protect, whilst supporting a separate lifeworld that is 
premised upon instrumental rationality. At the same time, it is dedicated to a 
function which it is formally obliged to be highly moralistic - the large-scale 
management of lethal violence – which lies outside the scope of normative 
political practice. The stance of the Army now, rather than its original 
Constitutional identity, can be understood then as one that ideologically excuses 
itself from the normative civil political space in order to both protect that space 
and mark itself as subservient to (and consequently more morally ordered than) 
the domain of civilian political power struggles and deliberation.  Through this 
stance, the Army legitimates itself, and its increasingly more system-based 
lifeworld. The emphasis on instrumental rationality supports its political neutrality 
(note how Wardynski emphasizes above the rhetorical utility of the cultural 
perception of the computer as a neutral “tool”).  
 This legitimation positioning is not only for the benefit of oversight 
authorities or the domestic public, but as OEMA notes in one report, since 42% 
of visitors to the America’s Army website are non-US, than the gamespace 
becomes representative of the basic values of the whole of American society - an 
opportunity for foreigners to "receive information about American ideals and 
values. Thus, the game embodies the capacity to communicate with rising 
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 generations abroad about the values and ethos that enliven the Army and the 
society whence the Army is drawn.” (2003:9) 
 The ideological positioning of the project is most fundamentally expressed 
in the three-way translation and reformulation of information freedoms. To 
compose its project rationale, politically, economically, and militarily, OEMA 
borrows concepts from the contemporary mainstream lifeworld of information 
age America: the language of internet business best practices; the idea of the 
digitally-empowered knowing and communicating citizen subject, adept with 
information flows and data multi-tasking; and the adaptation of new media 
popular culture for corporate marketing purposes31. The advertising slogan 
“Citizens. Countries. Video Games. The U.S. Army keeps them all free.” 
succinctly extols the equivalence made between individual freedom, military 
guarantees of national and international freedoms, and economic freedoms (of 
the market, and of the free distribution of the game). 
 From a critical perspective, this borrowing and equivalence might be 
understood as co-option or appropriation by a hegemonic institution, but from 
the Army’s perspective, this might be understood rather as respecting the 
dependence of a subservient military on the civilian lifeworld. The information-
empowered free citizen at the center of the three-way translation is 
simultaneously considered as the naturalized, mythologized traditional subject 
(the idea that freedom is what America and Americans have always been all 
about), and as the irresistibly novel product of the disruptive information 
revolution (the idea of the new internet-empowered generation of youth who are 
especially  free).  
 This ontological and ideological formulation is, of course, not simply one 
undertaken by OEMA, but is part of the dominant contemporary discourse that 
promotes information (and its less and more sentient siblings, data and 
                                                     
31 
See Chen, Ferazzi & Li (2003) on the subject of America’s Army as an “advergame”. 
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 knowledge) as the fundamental analytical and practical element of all social and 
natural phenomena (Castells, 1996) If the present specific instance of the OEMA 
project is not best thought of in terms of the system colonization of the lifeworld, 
it should noted though that the broader information technology (“information 
age”, “information society” etc.) discourse is characterized by the increasing 
encroachment of corporate technocratic logics of information and communication 
management in almost all spheres of life (Chesher, 1994). And furthermore, 
computer and internet development beginning with the roots of the cybernetic 
notion of computerized information interfaces as a model for human experience 
originate in US defense research (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 1997, Gray 1997). 
 The democratic identity of the America’s Army is insufficiently 
constructed and communicated purely on the basis of the rhetorical and 
technical borrowing of concepts from a hegemonic discourse which is already 
seen as a key system-colonizing and military-related force in contemporary 
culture. On the instrumental coded level of information and communication 
science, it makes sense to equate (as Wardynski does above) with a citizen’s 
ability to seek and discuss news through internet technologies with their 
potential proficiency with information age military hardware. This association has 
special mainstream appeal during wartime – as seen in Wagner James Au’s 
enthusiasm for a future generation of digital warriors fighting for liberalism. 
However, this instrumental dimension of the democratic cyberspace identity of 
the project is quite antithetical to normative ideas of how democratic discourse is 
practiced in cyberspace, which has its most vocal roots in techno-libertarian 
concerns of reclaiming internet technologies from their military and corporate 
framings (Barlow 1996). Information and market freedoms must also be shown 
to correspond with a respect for standard expectations of internet freedom of 
speech. 
 The coherency of the America’s Army gamespace’s democratic 
identity within the lifeworld space of internet popular culture consumption must 
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 be legitimated then through the adoption of practical functions and safeguards 
associated with the techno-libertarian side of CMC discourse32. This adoption 
also corresponds to the effort to establish the gamespace as one congenial to 
mainstream gamer culture activities. The communication of the legitimated 
identity of the Army takes place, then, not only through the design of the 
mechanics and experience of the video gameplay itself, but also through the 
construction and support of community in the gamespace of internet-mediated 
social relations created around the gameplay. 
Political Communication in the Official Gamespace 
 The official gamespace can be defined as that which is directly 
under the control of the America’s Army project. This comprises principally of the 
gameplay environment on Army-contracted public servers, and the community 
forums and chatrooms based on the official game website. The FPS gameplay 
environment itself, whilst it contains components for communication (the in-
game chat-box, and the conversations between players through voice 
communication network devices which are typical for games of this genre) 
represents an arena for interaction that appears to be completely antithetical to 
basic norms for rational discussion in the public sphere sense.  
 Firstly, it is based upon violence - aimed at defeating the other 
team in terms of capturing or dominating space and eliminating the presence of 
enemy participants. Of course these acts of violence are virtual, but so are the 
avatar bodies, and the mimetic outcome of the virtual killing is that of sudden 
removal of participants from the active domain of interaction. “Dead” players can 
still observe the game action on-screen, and also communicate with other “dead” 
players, or new players who are waiting for their first chance to play on the 
server. However, the content and mode of conversation in this space is also 
                                                     
32  One key observance of standard expectations for internet freedom is the lack of any personal 
tracking or data capture capabilities in the game’s technical structure. Government regulations 
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 extremely limited. Players are generally preoccupied watching and commenting 
humorously on the continuing gameplay, and waiting for the start of the new 
game. The brief time limit of each game session (a maximum of 10 minutes, and 
it is common for missions to be won within half that time), combined with the 
ephemeral nature of the chat messages (there is only a capacity for a very brief 
history of the recent conversations) automatically truncates any attempt at 
lengthy discussion in the space.  
 And once actually playing a new game mission, players are 
overwhelmingly preoccupied with succeeding in the game itself, and most 
rationally orientated conversation is concerned with team tactics and advice to 
less experienced players. It is common for game clans to have a rule against 
discussion of non-game topics or distracting attempts at humor during 
gameplay, especially over voice communications. Those players who attempt to 
subvert this general rule or offend in other ways (cheating, being excessively 
abusive, disrupting team operations etc.) are liable to be virtually killed or worse, 
“votekicked” off the server. This is the principal “democratic” mechanism in the 
game, where troublesome players can be proposed for a summary vote by the 
other participants that detemines whether they are allowed to stay on the game 
server.  
 Recent sociological studies of FPSs and other multiplayer online 
games have suggested that it is premature to dismiss the player interactions 
within the gamespace as trivial. For instance, ethnographers of the popular 
Counterstrike FPS (Wright & Briedenbach 2002; Wright, Boria & Briedenbach 
2002) have argued that player actions within the active game are not simply 
orientated to achieving game goals, but are frequently creatively turned towards 
expressing humorous, ironic, and even political sentiments (such as the use of 
the graffiti option in Counterstrike to write political messages on the walls). 
Moreover, they argue that the casual conversations exchanged during game chat 
                                                                                                                                                              
concerned with user privacy mean that only general statistical information about the community 
 47 
 
 
 in combination with the performances of participants during gameplay are key in 
symbolically expressing competition, collaboration, playfulness, gendering, and 
togetherness experienced by the players.  
  In emphasizing the significance of these forms of communication, 
it is argued that they are not only non-trivial but also relatively more complex 
than the limited range of in-game actions available to the player would suggest. 
This limitation is compounded by the absence of physical bodies and the range 
of non-verbal communication face and body cues. Wright & Briedenbach argue 
that this apparent limitation must be qualified with the understanding that it is 
quite common (but not typical) for gameplayers to gather in the same physical 
space. And even beyond physical space sharing, ethnographies of players of 
online persistent world roleplaying games have shown how many gamers form 
meaningful and long-lasting social relationships with others who they may only 
meet in the gameworld (Turkle, 1995). Tony Manninen (2003), in an attempt to 
lay out a Habermasian Communications Action Theory (CAT) framework for a 
sophisticated categorization of those in-game player actions perceivable on-
screen in a range of multiplayer game genres, proposes that it is possible to 
assign every kind of action a non-trivial rationality related to formal and informal 
social goals (instrumental, strategic, cooperative etc.). The narrow range of 
technical possibilities for intersubjective communication is compensated, 
Manninen argues, by the players’ suspension of disbelief, and the imaginative 
and artistic resources invested in the game that help make it a meaningful 
experience. 
 However, this perspective of these game actions as significant on 
the level of personal cultural experience does not convincingly overcome Frasca’s 
protest that these game actions are trivial in the broader political context.  
Notably, Manninen makes no attempt to place his CAT analysis of game actions 
in the context of Habermas’ general political project. The meaningful interactions 
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 in Wright, Boria & Briedenbach’s CounterStrike studies are limited to personal 
exchanges within a specific and roughly unchanging group of players. Even 
those who invest much emotion and effort in the politics of their virtual game 
community are not necessarily motivated to be politically or socially engaged in 
the offline world, and there is a common perception of a negative correlation in 
this respect (Turkle, 1995:242). In the interviews I conducted with America’s 
Army players, there was actually little evidence that players particularly valued 
in-gameplay actions beyond the enjoyment and mastery of gameplay itself. No 
interviewee had any favorite anecdotes to recount about gameplay successes or 
dramas when I asked them specifically for these. Indeed, there was often a 
certain air of bemusement at the notion that anyone would regard the gameplay 
in itself to be so important. 
 However, the value-laden institutional military context of the 
America’s Army game suggests that the range of player actions available within 
its game environment are an exception to the basic criticism of in-game actions 
being of marginal political significance. A primary aim of the game project is to 
communicate the image of the US Army has an organization tasked with the 
management of violence in the name of democracy, with explicitly defined moral 
values. These values are purportedly expressed in the design of gameplay: 
 
 “Player progress is linked to Army Values through game mechanisms such 
as the Honor Score. [The Army Values are] Teamwork & Loyalty, Duty, Respect, 
Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, Personal Courage (L.D.R.S.H.I.P.)” 
(OEMA, 2003a) 
 
 The Honor score system in the America’s Army gameplay punishes 
player actions such as attacking teammates and cheating, whilst rewarding 
leadership, teamplay, and the achieving of mission objectives. Players whose 
Honor scores fall to zero have their accounts deleted. Those players with higher 
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 Honor scores gain access to advanced missions, and are also given preference in 
team role selections.  Moreover, the representation of violence is kept to a 
minimum (only a faint splatter of blood is seen upon killing an enemy, and the 
body remains intact), and a parental control interface is available which can be 
used to deactivate blood effects; limit player access only to the training exercise 
missions and not to the “real war” missions; prevent access to the sniper role (a 
particularly sensitive issue after the 2002 Washington Sniper murder spree); and 
to filter out foul language in the in-game chat. 
 These game design features promote a positive public image of the 
Army, but were also intended to counter criticisms of the game. The Press Kit 
FAQs (produced by the Social and Political Sciences academic staff at OEMA) 
deal extensively with answering a range of potential criticism that accuse the 
game of promoting wanton violence, of militarizing youth culture, of potentially 
damaging the image of US Army, and even of helping to train enemies of the 
United States: 
“the Army Game encourages America’s democratic ideals in the application of 
military force.  The United States is highly regarded abroad for its respect for the 
rule of law.   The Army’s game embodies this respect for the rule of law by 
incorporating rules of engagement and the laws of war into game play.  The 
Game penalizes players who fail to abide by these rules.  Furthermore, the Game 
provides insights into the Army as an organization based upon a set of noble 
values. 
[…] 
We are not concerned that hostile entities might play the game.  Indeed, if they 
did they would discover that American Soldiers operate within a value-laden 
organization.  Perhaps they might even identify with these values and question 
their hostility to the United States.  Moreover, none of the information presented 
in the game is classified.   Also, there is nothing in the game that specifies how 
Army commanders and staffs plan and conduct specific types of operations.” 
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 (OEMA, 2003b) 
 
 But however effective these communications within the game may 
be for instilling a respect for Army values, they lie outside the rudimentary 
requirements for discursive communication. The limitations to in-game discursive 
communication suggested above are even more damaging to the notion of public 
sphere potential here than the drawbacks associated with internet-based 
discourse in general since the game environment is designed to aid gameplay, 
not communication itself. However, gameplay is still significant as the main 
provocation for the generation of communities around the game. There are 
hundreds of clans – groups of players which regularly play together and maintain 
a website with a community forum – that play America’s Army.  
 The community forums on these sites represent a more normative, 
stable, and decorous space for discussion – however, the content these clan 
forums are still limited by their primary self-identification as a site for escapist 
leisure pursuits. In this context, discussion on these forums are typically 
overwhelmingly concerned with game issues.  A typical America’s Army clan will 
generally express an identity (through player names, clan names, website 
graphics etc.) which either conforms to the military theme of the game 
(numerous clans are named after real life military units usually without having 
any real life relation to them e.g. 2nd Marine Force Recon Company, 79th Ranger 
Regiment, Portuguese Special Forces, Special Air Service); aspires to the genre 
atmosphere of the macho fantasy violence of FPS gaming (e.g. Natural Born 
Killers, ButcherSquad, Nothing Else Matters, secluded psychopaths achieving 
zen); or to bizarre humor, irreverent irony, and off-beat whimsy (e.g. Ministry of 
Silly Walks, Death by Friendly Fire, Royal Penguin Empire, and MarvelClan – a 
superhero-themed group)33.  
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  A prominent exception of an America’s Army community forum that 
positions itself above this trivialized identity is the forum of the official 
americasarmy.com website itself. It is here that we might expect to find the kind 
of reasonable discourse closest to the public sphere norms. 
 
The Official America’s Army Community Forum 
The official America’s Army player community is supported through the 
technical infrastructure embedded in the official website34, and comprises of a 
heavily used bulletin board (there are approx. 1 million posts to date) with 
multiple sections, and IRC (internet relay chat) servers for online real-time text-
based discussion (with approx. 100,000 registered users). Online chat 
communication spaces are not only generally seen as an arena for irreverent and 
unrooted conversation, but are relatively more ephemeral and less amenable to 
policed standards of discussion than comparative popular CMC means (see Reid, 
1991).  
In contrast, whilst the forum bulletin boards also have their share of 
unruly and flippant conversation, there is an overt and commonly held 
awareness that the structure, layout, and permanency35 of the discussion space 
here. This helps denote the space as an arena for more serious discussion topics 
and styles. This is can be seen as partly due to the shared cultural expectations 
amongst the fan population of what the public space of an internet community 
newsgroup or bulletin board is for.  These expectations are also inscribed into 
this space by the official technical infrastructure – sections for the discussion of 
game-only topics are divided from sections for conversations about off-game 
topics, and these in turn are distinguished between a section for trivial and 
                                                     
34  http://www.americasarmy.com/community.php 
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 humorous discussions and one for serious topics. In addition to the expectations 
about internet forum freedom of speech, OEMA has stated that it views these 
forums as a “Virtual Community of Interest in Soldiering” (2003:6). The potential 
of this community as a space for contact and dialogue between those who 
serving or have served in the military with civilians is recognized by the granting 
of special “Army Star” name icons to those players who can prove to the game 
authorities that they have a US military service record. Whilst those with Army 
Stars (holders may belong to any branch of the military) only comprise a tiny 
fraction of the overall America’s Army community – approx. 1,000 players out of 
a total population of approx. 2,000,000 (OEMA, 2003:2) – these players have the 
greatest prestige within the community, and if the vision of the project is 
fulfilled, their numbers will grow in the future. 
Given the prominence of the serious purpose of the game project, OEMA 
has recognized that it was important to designate a space for discussion of the 
serious real-life significance of the game that was marked off from those 
discussions which are obsessed only with playing the game itself, and also the 
broad range of off-beat humor found in such internet forums.   
The serious topic section, whilst only containing a small share of the total 
community posts (approx. 50,000 out of a million posts), is notable for the way 
the official moderators specifically encourage discussion of public interest issues 
and current affairs. In this section, a large post by the official moderators and 
fans is permanently fixed at the top of the discussion list – in this post, a large 
number of internet news sources of various perspectives and national origin are 
linked, and an open-ended invitation for fans to post their own news source links 
is made. These news sources are very diverse - they include not only 
mainstream news sites such as the New York Times, Fox News, the BBC World 
News, but also alternative sites such as the English language site of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
35  all posts on the official website are archived, unless specifically deleted – in contrast to 
unofficial clan forums where, while deletion of posts by forum administrators is rare, wholesale 
forum message deletion is commonly regularly carried out for reasons of server space shortages. 
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 controversial Arabic news station, Al-Jazeera; other international sources such as 
Le Monde (France) and Pravda (Russia); left-wing and right-wing opinion 
journals (The Nation, Newsmax); political intelligence forecasting agencies 
(stratfor.com, and debka.com) and news rumor/gossip sites (The Drudge Report, 
and its liberal counterpart, Buzzflash). It is also notable that the regular posters 
to the forums in general, and the serious topic section especially, are of an older 
mean age – estimated at about 26 years old36 – than the community as a whole. 
The discussion ranges across the political spectrum with the most common 
current affairs topics aired being concerned with the War on Terror and the 
military. 
Also permanently posted to the top of this forum are both a warning to 
show due respect when talking with others and a reminder of the Forum/IRC 
code of conduct which community members must agree to (this code is referred 
to both in terms of military jargon – “the Rules of Engagement” (ROE) – and of 
internet commerce - “the Terms of Service” (TOS)37 ).  This code of conduct not 
only sets out minimum expectations for appropriate behavior on the forum, but 
also emphasizes the relative independence of the forum content from monitoring 
and moderation (partly due to real-time technical nature of the forum, but also 
the shared expectation of free speech), and prohibits the posting of any abusive 
sentiments, illegal or deliberately deceptive statements, or commercial 
advertising:  
“Participation in our forums is a privilege. Before posting or responding on 
our forums please read the following rules and expectations… 
Considering the "real-time" nature of our forum, it is impossible for us to 
immediately review messages or confirm the validity of information as it is 
posted. Please note that we do not constantly monitor the contents of each post 
and are not responsible for any messages posted. We do not vouch for or 
                                                     
36  
Estimate made by project deputy director, Major Bret Wilson, in interview.  
37 
 See the “ROE” link at http://www.americasarmy.com/community.php 
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 warrant the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of any message, and are 
therefore not responsible for the contents of any message… 
As a reminder, you have agreed that you will not use our forum to post any 
material which is knowingly false and/or defamatory, abusive, vulgar, hateful, 
harassing, obscene, sexually oriented, threatening, invasive of a person's 
privacy, or otherwise violative of any law. Inappropriate use of our bulletin board 
includes (but is not limited to) the following: advertisements, chain letters, 
pyramid schemes, commercial solicitation, posting copyrighted material without 
permission, graphic vulgarity/nudity, etc. Put simply: when posting, combine a 
dose of common sense with the Golden Rule!” 
 
The official moderator emphasizes that the all posters will be equally dealt 
with for inappropriate behavior, and in particular personal attacks against others: 
“I don't care if you're a veteran, a professor, or a thirteen year-old, make a 
personal attack against someone and you will either receive a warning, or j
 ust be banned, depending on how severe the attack is, and how many 
you make.”38
 These official moderators have the power to censure abusive posters and 
can delete messages (moderators always explain why they are deleting the 
message, and the message is temporarily displayed in a “locked” forum for 
public viewing before deletion).  
 In interview, Major Bret Wilson (the America’s Army deputy director in 
charge of community management) noted that from his perspective, the most 
significant institutional “fight” in developing the game project was in defending 
the OEMA preference for a very open free speech standard for the forums – as 
this technically violates Army regulations on website design, content, and 
speech. Wilson argued that it was important to demonstrate that the Army was 
tolerant and democratic, rather than authoritarian. To have a heavily censored 
                                                     
38 http://www.americasarmy.com/forum/viewtopic.php?topic=59620&forum=29&6 
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 forum, or to discourage political conversation, would offend popular expectations 
of internet free speech, and so damage the image of the Army.  
 Furthermore, Wilson argued that strict discourse management 
would especially alienate young gamers, who would not be used to the 
hierarchical aspects of the Army lifeworld: “You’re trying to get people fired up 
about being in the Army… What image are they going to have of the Army… is it 
going to be their disciplinarian father, who says ‘don’t say that!’, or is it going to 
be your teacher, your mentor, your coach?” Moreover, it would miss an 
opportunity to consolidate the sense of “belonging” the game project could 
foster through the community. Wilson suggested that the wrong way of 
approaching the gamer community was to assume that it was characterized by 
teenagers who were “lazy slackers” with “no goals in life”. He argued instead 
that “[t]he right way… is that there are a number of different ways that you can 
make them feel part of this game, it’s that sense of ownership [we’re trying to 
promote]”. It was important for Wilson that the America’s Army project 
management understood how video gaming culture was more than an escapist, 
hedonist activity; that it was a site of socialization (including face-to-face 
relations) with a strong information culture ethic which encouraged the 
exchange of technical knowledge and skills  (including those useful outside the 
gamespace) within a broader context of offline and other online social relations. 
Wilson remarked that video gaming and the rest of life “are not separate and 
distinct from each other… [social] relationships are the same things as gaming… 
jobs are same things as gaming… it all fits [together]”. 
 A key part of treating the gamer culture with appropriate sophistication 
was honoring expectations of free speech – even in the case of opinions about 
controversial topics aired in the community that opposed those of the Army’s. As 
Major Wilson explained about the discussion of Gulf War 2 on the site:  
 “Some [views] are blatantly intended to incite a riot… like we shouldn’t be 
over there [in Iraq]…[but] what’s neat about it is that the community police 
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 themselves. [And y]ou need to have [dissenting opinions]. You gotta let them, 
you gotta let ‘em.” 
  
The forums, according to Wilson, actually reflected a mainstream cross-
section of American society: “They vary… it’s like the normal standard 
distribution… everyone’s clustered around [the topic threads that are] most 
progenitive… in GW2, its mostly clustered around the red, white, and blue. You 
have some outliers, but the majority would be favorable [in expressing support 
for the war].” Wilson also noted that the diversity of opinion and perspective on 
the forums challenged the stereotype that those in the US military, or otherwise 
participating in military culture, are politically monocultural:  
 
“[in the forums, we] have some veterans from the first Gulf War who are 
out of the Army… and are sharing their stories… and are actually on the left 
extreme [of the ideological scale] which is a shock to people… to some folks, 
[who think] that all folks in the military were card-carrying members of the 
Republican party. I think it’s an interesting education for everyone involved.” 
 
 To illustrate the maturity and reasonableness of discussions in the forums, 
Wilson pointed out one particular case of the debate on the forums between 
Jack Thompson - a lawyer who is well-known for his class-action suits against 
video game companies for allegedly promoting violence amongst American youth 
– and the America’s Army game players. Thompson registered himself on the 
America’s Army forums in order to personally dissuade gamers from playing the 
game, and to protest the hostile emails he received from fans after he 
denounced the video game on an ABC television news report. This incident also 
led to organized, widely circulated petitions against the report in the America’s 
Army community, a wave of complaints from players in ABC’s own website 
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 forums, and a fan-led campaign to boycott ABC news39. In his post, Thompson 
wrote: 
 
“What you do NOT have a right to do is send me emails and threaten to 
harm me and my family, as many of you have done. That is not a particularly 
American thing to do. It is something one would expect of al-Qaeda, and those 
of you who have done it are terrorists in every sense of the word. […] The Army 
removed the clear threats against ABC's [news anchor] Peter Jennings from this 
site. The Army's failure to do the same regarding me assures 1) that this site is 
in more trouble than it would otherwise be, and 2) that Congress will be 
interested in seeing that the Army facilitates physical and other threats against 
its critics as a matter of course. […] the Army and the Defense Department have 
a very long history of conducting unethical, illegal experiments upon soldiers and 
civilians. […] This ‘game’ is yet another experiment upon the unsuspecting 
pawns who play it. You are the latest guinea pigs. The guinea pigs have been 
trained to threaten people like me. You have taken the bait.”  
 
   Whilst it the initial reaction from OEMA was to propose the immediate 
deletion of Jack Thompson’s post, Wilson successfully argued that this would be 
counterproductive, as it would alienate the gamers from the free speech 
perspective, and that it would be best to trust players to be mature enough to 
debate with Thompson themselves. The majority of the responses to Jack 
Thompson’s post from players (which included high school age participants) 
indeed exhibit a degree of reasonableness and are not simply irreverent or 
hostile. For instance, several replies take note of Thompson’s basis of his higher 
moral ground on his Christianity and his quotation of Biblical scripture, and 
accordingly respond by quoting scripture in defense of the game. Other replies 
point Thompson toward academic studies that argue against the idea that violent 
                                                     
39  The discussion thread around Jack Thompson’s post can be found at 
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 video games incite real violent behavior. Others reproach Thompson for his own 
hostile approach to the discussion, and remind him of the standards of public 
forum discussion; the community’s basic expectations of reaching an 
understanding, of reasonably agreeing to disagree - as in this post addressed to 
Thompson: 
 
 “…you come to post on a public forum. The moderators can only do so 
much to ensure the protection of EVERYONE'S rights. This ranges from allowing 
a person to express their feelings, and others to be protected from slander and 
threats. Where do we find a common balance? This applies beyond our forum. 
To find common ground here, everyone has to let some things slip by. We 
cannot have a world where: anything offensive said is punishable; but you can 
say anything you ever want… please do not use terrorism, al-Qaeda, or any 
other types of these references. They look like cheap shots in an argument…”  
Critique of the Official Gamespace as a Public Sphere 
 How well does the official gamespace explored above test against the 
basic normative conditions of the ideal type public sphere? The official public 
forums appear to contain the most public sphere potential, and I focus primarily 
on this domain in the analysis: 
 
i. Autonomy from state and economic power. 
 The content of the official and non-official forums are protected 
by forum administrators from intrusion by external commercial 
interests. However, these forums are epiphenomena of a gamespace 
which is produced by a key state institution according to a logic of 
commercial enterprise. Consequently the game design, business 
model, and community development are dictated by state values and 
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 economic interests.  This is made clear, for instance, by the attempt 
to embed Army values within the gameplay, and the conflation of 
information freedoms in the OEMA economic rationale for the game.  
ii.                 Exchange and critique of moral-practical validity claims.  
 The designated space for serious and free discussion of current 
affairs and public interest issues on the official community website 
maintains a good basic standard for reasonable expression and 
freedom of speech. However, these discussions are still open to the 
accusations of triviality associated with internet forums in general. 
Aside from the community organization spurred to protest the ABC 
news report (which directly affected the gamer community itself), 
there is little evidence of other community political activity beyond 
discussion. This may be, in part, attributed to the large size of the 
official community, and the sense of anonymity and rootlessness this 
creates, relative to the smaller fan and clan sites. Moreover, only a 
small percentage of posters appear to be interested in the serious 
issue discussions. 
iii.                Reflexivity and critical awareness 
 There is a diversity of opinion and perspective on the forums, but 
there is a general tendency towards the exchange of polarized and 
entrenched views, rather than reflexive discussion aimed at 
achieving reasoned consensus. This problem is typical of many 
internet debate spaces. The lack of emotional investment and 
physical engagement compared with the embodied face-to-face 
deliberation preferred by the Habermasian ideal type model, 
combined with the vagueness of the political purpose and efficacy of 
the community space, mean that forum participants have less 
motivation to change their minds, or evolve the discussion.  
 Whilst the example of the Jack Thompson message thread 
demonstrates the willingness of game players to engage in 
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 reasonable discussion with an outsider on equal terms, there is little 
indication of much of a stance on the part of the fans beyond 
defensiveness, and the repudiation of Thompson’s claims. The sides 
of the game violence debate introduced by Thompson are already 
polarized here – Thompson is adamantly opposed to the game 
project, and the players’ defensive response is taken to the point of 
possible harassment (or so Thompson alleges). The broader public 
audience whose minds may be swayed by the arguments on either 
side are not present in the debate space here. The only external 
constituency which might be influenced by the America’s Army 
community actions are the executives at the ABC television network, 
but again this engagement is one of antagonism (through the 
players’ petitions and the boycott of ABC) rather than deliberation. 
iv.                Sincerity and honesty  
 While the moderators of the official forums have the power to 
censure deceptive, harassing, or otherwise unreasonable posts, the 
limited amount of resources committed to managing the community 
spaces means that there is considerable room for insincere or 
dishonest posts. While the institutional context of the gamespace 
supports a higher premium for ethical standards of discussion 
compared with other game communities, the lack of political purpose 
beyond free discussion means that this is not a fundamental priority 
for either the participants or the official authority. 
  
v.    Discursive inclusion and equality within a shared communicative 
 framework 
 The members of the America’s Army community share a lifeworld 
experience with a pronounced moral and symbolic communicative 
framework – the FPS gamer culture in the institutional context of the 
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 US Army. Regarding the specific question of rebuilding civilian-military 
relations, there is clear potential here for the sharing of civilian and 
military lifeworlds. Also, the project administrators who deal with 
misconduct by players both on official game servers and within the 
forum and chat spaces, are formally committed to treating fans 
equally regardless of their real life identity.  There is also a 
significantly broad cross-section of opinion and perspective expressed 
in the community spaces.  
  However, this community is one that is very much a 
marginal one compared with the broad public sphere community 
imagined in the ideal type public sphere model. Furthermore, there 
are inequalities of prestige and respect between those players with 
Army Stars and civilian players, and also between American players 
and overseas players. Moreover, the gender bias of the FPS gamer 
culture means that the community is overwhelmingly male40. 
The Broader Gamespace: Three Exceptional Cases 
 The public sphere assessment of the primary gamespaces explored 
above can be summarized as demonstrating fatal weaknesses in three main 
ways: 
 
i. The overarching purpose of the America’s Army gamespace is one of 
ideological and instrumental communication by a hegemonic state 
institution. The question of whether there is public sphere potential 
here for the revitalization of democratic civilian-military relations must 
also address the degree to which the project threatens an 
undemocratic militarization of public space i.e. a colonization of the 
lifeworld by system rationality. An urgent potential consequence of this 
                                                     
40  in my investigations of the game, I only came across only three or four female players out of 
hundreds – unfortunately, none of them were available for interview. 
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 is a reduction in the capacity of the public to rationally argue and 
deliberate over military affairs. 
ii. The gamespace is centered around non-discursive forms of player 
actions in gameplay which are antithetical to basic premises for 
meaningful discussion. And furthermore, even discursive 
communication within the forums of the gamespace is trivialized by 
the prevailing atmosphere of escapism and leisure. These 
characteristics make the cultural discourse within the gamespace 
especially vulnerable to the general criticisms of how CMC interactions 
fall short of norms of Habermasian communicative rationality.   
iii. The exercise of freedom of speech on the public forums can be 
regarded as a mask of publicity that asserts a techno-libertarian 
democratic ideal that obscures the far more crucial significance of the 
economic logic of the project. It is this economic logic, adapted from 
the business models of the information revolution and naturalized in 
the translation between market freedom with freedom of speech, 
which will produce substantive material effects. In comparison, the 
political discussion in the gamespace is fatuous. 
    
 Each of these three weaknesses in themselves undermine the 
legitimacy of the notion of the America’s Army gamespace as a potential public 
sphere, if they are understood as characterizing the totality of significant political 
interactions possible in this community.  However, it is insufficient to examine 
the America’s Army gamespace in terms of only its primary and official 
manifestations. Whilst the gamespace is currently not functioning close to the 
Habermasian normative ideal of public sphere, I argue that in the next three 
chapters how one should look beyond the primary gamespace and the 
mainstream contexts of mainstream practices to certain exceptional 
communities, in which evidence of more robust public sphere potential is to be 
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 found. I identify three game culture groups which are notably active in America’s 
Army community which all have a strongly articulated, enacted, and 
expansionary political agenda and identity that reaches beyond the gamespace 
and is non-trivially engaged in off-line public interest issues: the real-life military 
and veteran gamers; Christian Evangelicals; and hackers. This exceptional 
orientation means that these groups have a special tendency for escaping, 
refusing, and even subverting both the dominant official logic of the gamespace 
and the limited public significance of gamer culture.  
 I do not claim that the political activities of any of these three 
exceptional communities constitute a space close to the normative ideal-type 
public sphere. However, I argue that each has a particular characteristic political 
activity and orientation which demonstrates how a corresponding fatal weakness 
can be transcended, and furthermore, indicates how the standard model and 
critique of internet public sphere potential may be insufficient for assessing 
gamer culture in this instance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3:  America’s Army at War:  
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   The Military Gamers and the Militarization critique 
  
The Militarization Critique 
 Habermas' concerns about the perversion of public sphere communicative 
rationality in the service of technical-instrumental interests are built upon the 
Frankfurt School critics' model of the transformation of 19th century bourgeois 
liberal democratic capitalism into the militaristic/corporatist state and monopoly 
capitalism of the 1930s, in which the public space for deliberative reason 
mutated into the domain of managed mass cultural consumption produced by 
corporate interests41. The anxiety here is that not only does military 
development represent a powerful socio-cultural drive towards modeling civil 
society according to non-consensual technical-instrumental values, but rational 
public discussion of military affairs is also increasingly thwarted. 
  Contemporary critics of the relationship between state military 
interests and commercial media technology development argue that this 
relationship is driving a fusion of digital and physical reality is disrupting the 
public’s capacity to rationally deliberate over the actuality of contemporary war. 
In spite of the conditions of US military’s traditional or formal democratic 
legitimacy, commentators have suggested that the predominance of US military 
spending and technical research & development nationally and globally means 
that there is an inevitable tendency towards domination of civilian domains. For 
instance, Tim Lenoir, in his comprehensive historical accounts of the relationship 
between the electronic entertainment industry and the defense simulation 
community in the United States, has argued that this relationship (what he calls 
“the military-entertainment complex”) is the leading indicator of how “[in] 
                                                     
41  
For the Frankfurt School theorists, a key concern was that the sophisticated abuse of media 
technologies by European Fascism for social manipulation was finding its post-war parallel in the 
Hollywood capitalist model of consumer entertainment - "a culture industry" which contributed to 
the fusion and domination of political, economic, and private spheres by economic interests 
whilst society tended towards an increasingly technocratic, administered, and undemocratic form 
centered on functionalist instrumental reason. 
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 numerous areas of our daily activities, we are witnessing a drive toward fusion of 
digital and physical reality... [toward] a new country of ubiquitous computing…” 
(2000:291).  
Around Gulf War 1 in the early 1990s, a widely expressed moral anxiety 
concerning the fate of the public sphere today was the perception that the 
television coverage of the war (especially the public broadcast of military videos 
of missiles hitting targets taken from the US weapons cameras) had generated a 
public discourse of war transfixed and seduced by the equivalence of the 
imagery to that of the video game screen – a immediate yet mediated 
experience perversely disconnected from the reality of war42.  
 This popular anxiety encouraged one of the most well-known intellectual 
controversies associated with Gulf War 1 - the philosopher Jean Baudrillard’s 
claim that “The Gulf War did not take place”. In the context of his signature 
postmodernist thesis of “hyperreality” (in which he claims that ever more 
sophisticated media technologies within the context of consumer capitalism are 
weakening or even obliterating the boundaries between simulation and reality) 
Baudrillard argued that Gulf War 1 had been the first “virtual engagement’ of 
military force: “the war itself exerts its ravages on another level, through faking, 
through hyperreality,.. with the precession of the virtual over the real... and the 
inexorable confusion between the two.”43 Baudrillard’s commentary was heavily 
criticized. Most notably, the philosopher Chris Norris complained that the fact 
that people were taking Baudrillard’s postmodern analysis seriously was a sign of 
“a widespread cultural malaise” in a morally degraded public sphere discourse 
about war (Norris, 1992). 
 Another influential philosophical commentator on the blurring of virtuality 
and reality in the media representation of Gulf War 1 was the military-media 
theorist Paul Virilio (1991). Virilio argued that the confusion between the screen 
                                                     
42  General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the Coalition forces, was himself quoted as 
remarking that this conflict was “the first Nintendo war” (Sheff, 1993:285). 
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 images of the television news and the missile camera encourages an illusion of 
public participation and complicity in the act of war shown, which makes the 
critical differentiation between the virtual and the real impossible – the result is a 
shrinking of the sense of independent public reason, imposed by the drive of 
military reason44.  
 The consequences of this tendency are intensified by the proliferation of 
networked interactivity and abstracted information, so that in Virilio’s vision: 
“[t]he capacity of interactivity is going to reduce the world to nearly nothing. 
[...] In the near future, people will feel enclosed in a small environment... at the 
limit of tolerability, by virtue of the speed of information….”45. In other words, 
the development of interactive communication technologies is leading to the 
obliteration of the public, and the reduction of the citizen to the systemic 
instrumentality of the digital warrior: “[t]he disintegration of the warrior’s 
personality is at a very advanced stage. Looking up, he sees the digital display… 
looking down, the radar screen, the onboard computer, the radio, and the video 
screen...”  (1989:84). 
 James Der Derian, the primary proponent of Virilio’s military-media theory 
in the United States, has identified the convergence of military and 
entertainment media interests with the foundation of such institutions as the 
ICT, as the clearest and most dangerous recent manifestation of the military 
rationality of media development (2001). Der Derian argues that the 
management of public media culture for military purposes has created a 
discursive construction of “virtuous war” where military action is legitimized in 
the name of democracy and human rights, and made to seem “clean” by the 
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 in the March 29 1991 UK Guardian newspaper article, “The Gulf War Has Not Taken Place”. 
44  
For Virilio, military reason is a historical force underlying all technological development and is 
overwhelmingly concerned with increasing abilities of speed  - what he terms a “dromological” 
rationality. The immediacy of action, and implosion of space-time distances enabled by 
interactive media technologies are especially important for the dromological drive’s “logistics of 
perception” (1989). 
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45  As remarked by Virilio as interview by James Der Derian, Wired magazine, May 1996. 
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 hiding of the real violence of war from public view. He suggests that this 
strategic and geo-political phenomenon finds its domestic equivalent in the 
accusations that video game culture encourages the desensitization of youth 
towards images of violence through its ergodic sensationalization and 
trivialization of killing, potentially to psychopathic extremes46: “New technologies 
of imitation and simulation [are widening the gap] between the reality and 
virtuality of war. As the confusion of one for the other grows, we face the 
danger of a new kind of trauma without sight, drama without tragedy, where 
television wars and video war games blur together. We witness this not only at 
the international level, from the Gulf War to the Kosovo campaign, but also on 
the domestic front, where two teenagers [the perpetrators of the 1999 
Columbine massacre] predisposed to violence confused the video game Doom 
for the high school classroom.” (2001:11) 
 The America’s Army gamespace here appears to be vulnerable to the 
critique of the blurring of real and virtual violence here both on the level of its 
formal rationale and legitimation, and on the level of the informal attitudes of 
the FPS gamer culture, in spite of the Army’s elaborate efforts to establish the 
game experience as a one which is highly sensitive and moralistic about the 
representation of violence and war.  These vulnerabilities were illustrated, for 
instance, in two interviews with two casual gamers who belong to the America’s 
Army clan, Drunks with Guns -  a typical mainstream gamer group.  
   Whilst the negative coverage of the game by ABC which linked it to the 
game violence debate sparked consternation and organized protest amongst the 
America’s Army community in general, not all gamers object to the idea that 
violence and war may be glorified and sensationalized in video games. For 
(DWG) S. who had spent a great deal of time playing FPSs since high school, the 
experience of interactive virtual and graphic violence was the genre’s special 
                                                     
46  A key anti-video game violence text is Grossman & Degaetao’s Stop Teaching Our Kids to 
Kill: A Call to Action against TV, Movie & Video Game Violence (1999). 
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 appeal. He specifically cited the ABC news report was the key initial motivation 
for playing the game:  
 
 “I was at a bar and we saw a news story about America’s Army on ABC… 
slamming it for the violence in today's youth. I went home and downloaded the 
game immediately… in all honesty, I wanted to get a feel of why ABC News was 
slamming it for violence in today's youth. I've always been in opposition of that 
idea. Another thing about it that I liked was how ABC said the weaponry was 
more realistic than any other game out there on the market.” 
 
  Whilst (DWG) S. indicated that he had no interest in joining the military 
whatsoever (although he did enjoy paintball and range shooting), the outbreak 
of Gulf War 2 did make him feel “more addicted” to, and more gratified from, 
playing America’s Army as the daily media coverage of the war excited him: 
 
 “[The war] has only affected me in the way that I want to play more. [I] 
guess it’s an adrenaline thing… watching the war and then playing AA. Yeah. I 
feel better every time I kill the OPFOR in [the desert] Insurgent Camp [level] 
now… it also made me wish I was shooting at the French [since they had 
opposed the war]…. [with the current war,] in a sadistic sort of way there is an 
irony about the desert scenarios. I'm sure that is unintentional with the current 
situation in Iraq.” 
 
  This kind of gaming pleasure and celebration of the sense of moral 
ambiguity in the video gameplay space is quite contrary to the ideal of the 
morally superior FPS experience communicating noble Army values that the 
official project rationale envisions. From the public sphere perspective, this kind 
of flippant, sensationalistic attitude towards virtual violence (a core trait of much 
video game culture) which escapes the official moral position of the game 
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 threatens to undermine the credibility of the broader gamespace as a rational 
civilian-military community for serious discussion. On the other hand, even close 
identification with the institutional values communicated by the game may be 
distorted through the lens of broader gamer culture. Take, for instance, the case 
of (DWG) K., a civilian player who enlisted in the US Army in 2003, and 
attributed “70%” of his motivations to his America’s Army gameplaying 
experiences. He had this to say about his decision (I interviewed him only a few 
hours before he was leaving by bus to boot camp): 
 
 “I was playing about 8 hrs a day… I was psyched to play this one level 
[called] ‘Weapons Cache’ because we had practiced forever on it. Nobody 
showed but me. I was so f****** p****** to this day I can’t believe how mad I 
was. The thought in my mind was ‘there would be no way in hell would they do 
this in the army’…from that moment on I played less AA and started looking for 
more info on the [real] Army… after all the wins and victories I had I didn’t feel 
as good when around [people] who where veterans and [when I said] ‘ya. I’m so 
good at this army game’ and they just look at you like ‘mother******, its just a 
game.…’ I actually sat back and said I know I can do this in real life.” 
 
  (DWG) K. also suggested that “deep down” he felt that the game had 
taught him the Army L.D.R.S.H.I.P values through its emphasis on successful 
teamplay, and that this had better prepared him for boot camp. 
 And in relation to the outbreak of Gulf War 2, (DWG) K. told me that the 
news media’s war coverage encouraged his immersion in America’s Army game-
playing. He would regularly hurry home from work to play 8 hours a night with 
the TV news on, concentrating especially on the desert levels. And once the 
news story broke about the Iraqi capture of US POWs, on those missions 
involving prisoner rescue: 
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  “Well, I stuck to the Hostage Rescue missions. The new map Radio Tower 
[which involves the rescue of hostages] was almost a real life scenario of what 
was going on over in Baghdad and if I told you how much I played that scenario 
over and over I think you would puke, or say: get a life… hahaha…   on average 
I was playing 8 hrs a day after coming home from work… all the while CNN was 
on…   I notched up playing time when knowing there were [US] POWs [in 
Iraq]…   well, first thing in all honesty I prayed to God for the safe recovery of 
all POWs and to grant them peace [until] I finally get over there to do 
something... for some sick reason I wish I was over there trying to help or do 
something… people around me thought I was crazy… because their idea of a 
"good life" is just sitting at home getting old and everything seeming to be safe? 
[these people are] letting others fight their battles.” 
 
It was common for both military and civilian players to note the uncanny 
feeling of playing America’s Army whilst a real US-led ground war was underway 
in the Middle East. A common conversational topic noted in my gameplay 
sessions on public servers was whether or not the game experience encouraged 
players to think about joining the Army. Since a frequent experience, especially 
for the new player, is to die suddenly from a surprise shot from an unseen 
enemy soldier within the first few minutes of the game, players were often heard 
to speculate on the insane riskiness of real combat or to bemoan the lack of in-
game representation of close air support, armor, and other supporting military 
forces one might expect in real life. Even advanced players can typically expect 
to see at least one side in a game mission suffer more than 50% fatalities47.  
 (DWG) K.’s account demonstrates a further awareness on his part of the 
moral and ontological confusion of real and virtual war that America’s Army 
provokes. The same feelings he describes as being seen as “sick” and “crazy”, 
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47  This effect is common enough that the America’s Army developers are planning the 
introduction of artificial intelligence controlled OPFOR soldiers in certain new levels in order to 
more accurately depict Army doctrines of overwhelming force, and minimal casualty rates. 
 
 
 
 seem also sincere and noble in his mind. These feelings of uncanny unease 
might be attributed to the disorientation of crossing the boundary from 
identifying oneself with the lifeworld of the hedonistic civilian gamer to that of 
the morally strong and socially certain lifeworld of the military mindset – as 
suggested by his impatience with his clan members for failing to demonstrate 
the same commitment and discipline which he enjoyed experiencing. (DWG) K. 
appears to be a model example of a civilian player who has fully imbibed the 
official ideological message communicated by the game. However, there is also a 
hint of over-identification with the drama of combat presented with the game, to 
the point where his crossing over from civilian to military lifeworld is facilitated 
by a blurring of the mediated representation of real war on the television screen 
with its ergodic virtual re-enactment within the game. The “blurring” experienced 
by (DWG) K. appears to be vulnerable to the military-media convergence 
critiques. 
 
The Military Gamers 
 To challenge the militarization critique here, I somewhat counter-
intuitively point to the exceptional community of America’s Army players who are 
also active duty or veteran military personnel. The two real life military AA 
groups, 1st Veterans’ Battalion and Joint Task Force, are both notable for their 
strong identification with the US armed forces. Neither group has any official 
affiliation with the America’s Army project or any other military organization. 
They are entirely fan created and operated. Both groups are characterized by 
members from all branches of the military, and the 1VB group, with several 
hundred members, contains the bulk of the total “Army Star” population in the 
America’s Army community. Both memorialize real-life military dead, prisoners of 
war, and those missing in action with graphics that take up the entire front 
pages of their websites (1VB has a dedicated, animated Flame of the Unknown 
Soldier; JTF has a large graphics of the POW-MIA symbol of the campaign to 
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 remember missing US soldiers). On the front page of the 1VB website, the 
values of the community are asserted as so: 
 
“The 1st Veterans Battalion has adopted the same guiding principles as 
the U.S. Army. We have based much of our philosophy, structure and training on 
these core principles. […] ‘Values are at the core of everything our Army is and 
does. Your commitment to living and teaching the Army’s core values is critical 
to our success today and tomorrow.’ -GEN. Dennis J. Reimer” 
  
 And the JTF community lists as its first rule: 
 
“1. Members will at all times be expected to conduct themselves in a manner 
that brings credit to the Department of Defense, their parent service and the 
JTF. […] Three documented and verifiable complaints will result in expulsion […] 
and an effort to get you out of AA altogether.” 
 Both the 1VB and the JTF refuse to use the term “clan” to describe 
themselves, preferring military terms such as “battalion” and “unit” in order to 
emphasize their special values, structure, and constituency. (JTF) W. explains: 
 
 “We are not a clan. We are a unit. We use the U.S. military as the model 
for our organizational structure. Individuals have different ranks, with those 
ranks comes responsibility in assisting in running the team. A clan is a loose 
affiliation of similar individuals… a family. A unit [is where people from] all walks 
of life come together to accomplish something, through cooperation, 
communication and teamwork.” 
 Both these military gamer communities distinguish themselves structurally 
from civilian clans through organizing and training players in military style 
squads with a chain of command where rank is based on commitment to the 
game group (1VB has numerous squads, including a “NATO” squad for non-US 
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 military/veteran players; JTF models itself after the formal Army fashion of a “HQ 
unit”, a “rear detachment”, and several “rifle squads”).  At the same time as 
providing a sense of ontological security and communal familiarity, pleasure is 
gained by the military players from applying not simply their military training in 
real-life battle tactics etc., but more importantly their group and command-
orientated mindset, which gives them significant advantage when playing against 
civilian teams. All the military players interviewed cited this as the main 
satisfaction they obtained from the gameplay. As (JTF) W. put it:  
  
 “[the best thing] with my team we do… [is] trounce the little 
Counterstrikers48 (derogatory term for non-teamwork using fools) into the 
ground… that was the emotional satisfaction, proving the whole real army [point 
of view]… TEAM TEAM TEAM...” 
 These military gamer groups appear to very closely conforming to, and 
reproducing, the institutional ideology and hierarchical social structure of the US 
military. This is inevitable given that the members of these communities 
generally inhabit and support the distinct lifeworld of the US military. But in 
terms of the militarization critique – particularly given their greater prestige -  
these groups may be seen as complicit in the anti-democratic and militaristic 
tendencies of the gamespace.  
 However, I would argue that it is more appropriate to see this community 
as politically exceptional rather than ultra-conformist. Whilst the “Army Star” 
players have a special prestige in the America’s Army gamespace, their cultural 
influence here is secondary relative to the dominant system logic of the official 
strategic communication rationale, and the wider lifeworld of the FPS gamer 
culture. The perspective and political agenda of the military gamers can be 
distinguished from these broader influences if it is understood that they are 
 
 
74
 promoting their personal military lifeworld identity through the gamespace, and 
not simply replicating official Army ideology. For instance, the reproduction of US 
military organizational structures in the military game groups does not mean that 
they actually socially operate as an enforced command hierarchy. Rank is based 
not on real life military seniority, but the degree of commitment and contribution 
to the game-playing group.  Chains of command generally only operate during 
gameplay to ensure proper execution of team tactics, relations are otherwise 
informal and centered around relaxation and casual conversation.  
 One might say that the military gamers are soldiers who are acting at 
playing soldiers. But the exceptional political agenda for these groups stem from 
their need to assert their lifeworld experience as real military personnel in the 
broader gamespace, and to promote an agenda concerned with veterans’ affairs. 
A fundamental motivation for a military gamer joining these communities, is to 
socialize within a familiar military lifeworld, and distinguish oneself from what is 
perceived as the more lax, irresponsible and juvenile world of civilian players. It 
is noticeable for instance, how there is a significantly greater frequency of 
discussion concerned with serious military affairs and political news on the 
community website forums of these military gamer groups than there typically is 
in the civilian clan forums I observed. Many posts are specifically related to 
military culture – such as advice for new recruits for surviving boot camp, and 
prose memorializing the combat dead. More generally, subjects for debate and 
discussion in the 1VB forum within a typical fortnight, for instance, ranged more 
broadly in content and orientation. Topics discussed included promotion of a 
Republican pro-US political rally; the future of the Euro currency; weight loss 
advice; Israeli discrimination against Palestinians; US university political 
correctness; national gun control policy. Some discussions even weighed heavily 
against the official views of the US military – in one 1VB forum poll and 
discussion, the large majority of participants agreed with the proposition that 
                                                                                                                                                              
48  A reference to the FPS game Counterstrike which sparked the online tactical FPS genre, but 
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 PFC. Jessica Lynch’s widely reported and celebrated experiences in Iraq were 
actually not deserving of the Bronze Star medal she was awarded, and that the 
whole affair was basically a US Army propaganda exercise. Furthermore, the 
groups’ scope of membership (and so the scope of their sense of shared 
lifeworld) extends beyond the US armed forces – 1VB has a substantial 
contingent of non-US military veterans; JTF counts firefighters and policemen as 
fellow professionals committed to upholding national security. 
 The military gamer groups’ role in supporting the military lifeworld 
experience of their members extends into the off-line world, and even to familial 
relations.  (JTF) W noted that many members of his military gamer group know 
each other in real life, and socialize in non-virtual spaces. He also noted that 
most of the JTF community – even those he has never met face-to-face – would 
be traveling to his graduation ceremony at his service school. Military 
interviewees also notably reported that many of those community members who 
had families would play America’s Army with their children and spouses on 
community servers – a habit which is almost unheard of in civilian clans. (1VB) 
S. explains:  
 “Well, I think it’s a way to be involved in their lives and it’s a way for the 
kids to learn to interact with adults… the kids are thrilled to be on with us and 
respect their unique position …they think it’s pretty cool [that] not only are they 
playing with Dad’s friends but they’re playing with real soldiers, airmen, marines, 
seamen etc... AND be on [voice] comms with them… no other kids get that.” 
 
 This family context represents an extension of the private into a specific 
community space, where orderly military lifeworld values and norms can be 
nurtured in the minds of the adult players’ children. (JTF) C. remarked that a key 
mission for the JTF community was to offer “mentorship and guiding force to the 
younger generations… To give them a place they can ask questions and learn. 
                                                                                                                                                              
is today widely seen as a game too frequently prone to the immature, cheaters and abusers. 
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 JTF tries to be a big brother… to some to help them stay away from bad 
elements and groups.” 
 
 There is a strong sense in the military gamer communities that they must 
distinguish themselves as above the general atmosphere of the irreverent, the 
carnivalesque, and the corrupt that characterizes the virtual gamespace as this is 
unsettling for the serious nature of their real-life military identity.  A special 
source of upset are those civilian players who pose as real life military in the 
America’s Army gamespace. As (1VB) B. explains: 
 
 “There are a number of people that play that claim to be in the military, 
they portray themselves as full of military knowledge and skills.  They really do 
generally put the military in a bad light as they are generally jerks and cause 
problems.  I take great pleasure in identifying then sending a cruise missile in 
their general direction… They are often pretty good, the internet provides lots of 
info to this guys, it generally is going to take someone who has been in the 
military to identify them.”49
 The special political identity and agenda of the military groups is especially 
strongly asserted during wartime – when the need to distinguish themselves 
from civilian gamers, and also to be involved in real world soldiers’ affairs is 
particularly felt as urgent. For 1VB, during Gulf War 2, the group organized itself 
as a virtual Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) post50 which lent moral and 
practical support to deployed troops overseas. (1VB) P.  explained: 
                                                     
49  Both military gamer groups described here have procedures in place for checking the military 
record claimed by potential new members. As one 1VB member noted, this process is easy when 
you have group members who actually work in military intelligence. 
50  (1VB) S, a Gulf War veteran himself, suggested that many of the Gulf War and Vietnam 
veterans in 1VB felt much more comfortable using the gamer community as a source of support 
than visiting their actual local VFW post: “Well, there’s a certain amount of Awe we have for 
those [World War 2] guys… and it’s like we don’t want to disturb that club… the old breed fought 
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  “We have a community of Veterans/Active Duty who have a lot of Pride. 
Well, the game has brought us together, but we are also talking and doing some 
things regarding RL [real life] issues… like our care packages, we have quite a 
few guys deployed to Iraq…. We are donating and sending out care packages to 
them… that's a man’s best friend in the field!” 
 
 Beyond its function as a virtual VFW post, the America’s Army gamespace 
also offered an immersive experience of nostalgia through its 3D modeling of 
actual Army training locations. All the military players remarked on the fidelity of 
the representation of these locations and related the memories it brought back 
with some amusement. (1VB) P, who was invalided out of the Army after a 
paradrop training accident which damaged his knee, related to me how the 
Airborne training mission in the game, particularly brought vivid, embodied  
memories back: 
 “…going up the [paradrop training] tower [in the game] was a flashback so 
I placed myself back there (in '88)…  nervous, yes… then waiting up there 
viewing the scenery, hehe, what a thrill… then the drop... wow...went just like 
the training [in real life.] It's different because I wasn't really there but I found 
myself moving my body… hehe… so again, nervous… sweaty hands… hehe… all 
the directions by the black hat [instructor] were correct as in real life […] birds in 
my stomach when I left the plane […] I could feel the Euphoria after 
straightening my ‘chute and seemingly floating in the air […] I did say ‘oh sh**’ 
before I hit the ground… I remember saying that in [real life before hitting the 
ground.]” 
 
 In (1VB) P.’s account of his embodied recall of his paradrop accident within 
the immersive context of the game experience, we can see how the military 
                                                                                                                                                              
wars without all the technical craziness that we do… there’s also that sense you maybe don’t 
want to hear how easy you had it compared to them even though its true.” 
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 players have a more rooted relationship between their physical body and the 
virtual body of their game avatar. The relationship and difference between the 
virtual representation of bodily injury and the actual possibility of injury in 
combat was a constant background tension for them in the game. A typical 
comment on this matter was made by (JTF) C.: 
 
 “I would have to say, no ‘game’ will ever really capture the true essence of 
life and death. Just because it is a game...when you die in game, you can always 
reboot. In life... no joy. To be honest, there are some things I would choose to 
forget [about my military experience], but cannot. If this or any other game was 
to remind me a lot of those incidents in my life, I would trash the game, I do not 
care if it is the best game of the decade and everyone in the free world is 
playing it… [America’s Army is] a game.  War is real.  BIG difference.” 
 
  These tensions were cast into the foreground of the minds of the 
1VB and JTF players with the outbreak of Gulf War 2, where the anticipated US 
casualty level was predicted in the several thousands. It was related to me how 
the America’s Army gamespace became a more sullen place for these groups, 
while also emerging a vital space for support. 1VB and JTF members who were 
deployed to the Gulf, attempted to keep in regular contact with their gamer 
groups, even posting stories and photographs from the front. Several of those 
deployed have been injured in operations (e.g. 1VB’s commander – who has 
since returned from Iraq - was wounded in a RPG attack on his unit’s tactical 
operations center). The second-in-command of JTF posted this forum message 
from the Gulf whilst major combat operations in Iraq were still underway:  
 
 “ we was all at the Harbor getting our vehicles and we had already had 12 
Scud alarms (which I will remember for the rest of my life) and all of a sudden 
we hear a Thoompp...Boooom and a flash and the ground shook and sh**, I 
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 was like WTF. I ran around the humvee and saw a red hue about I would say 
1/2 mile off. But then the Scud alarm went off and I was like Slam got my sh** 
on in under 5 seconds threw my Jlist on (new MOPP gear) and went to the 
humvee and waited for the alarm to stop. It stops and they call a FORMATION at 
the front of the column of vehicles!  I’m like ok whatever then LT [the 
lieutenant] was like ‘A scud just hit 300m away this is no BS people we roll out 
at daybreak’.  We was supposed to have left 2 hrs before.  So I’m like ‘Hey LT 
can we smoke?’  The reply was no you cannot smoke and I’m like (along with 
40plus other soldiers) was like f*** that s*** we all lit on up rite there she was 
like WTF and we all walked across the street and chilled a bit then another Scud 
alarm. It was a hell of a night.     
To all the new faces and names, you soldiers are in the best America’s Army 
Squad on the net.  The JTF will take care of you both on and off the net.”   
 
 (1VB) S. told me about “the tremendous amounts of guilt that a lot of 
veterans experienced after the GW II broke out… because that’s what we trained 
for…” and explained how the desert levels of America’s Army became sites, not 
for joyful play and leisure, but for veterans and military family members to relate 
and explore their solemn anxieties about what it would be like in the Gulf.  In 
contrast to the civilian players, (DWG) S. and (DWG) K., (1VB) P. related to me 
how, whilst he still spent much time with the 1VB online community, it became 
impossible for him (like other military gamers he knew) to play the game during 
wartime: 
 
 “the war changed everything… the game has taken a back seat… I barely 
play any more… because the war envelops my time… it's hard to explain if you’re 
not a Veteran… it's something we all share […] we pray for the fallen and those 
still there… heck, we even pray for the enemy soldiers, that they may lay down 
their arms and not lose their life… it is the Sacrifice we all share.” 
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Implications for the Militarization Critique 
 One of the principal criticisms of cyberspace-based discussion is that the 
abstraction of the interaction both from physical locales and from a personal 
sense of embodiment meant that the space was essentially ungrounded. 
Consequently, this is said to encourage a fluidity and irreverence of identity 
which potentially undermines the gravity and trustworthiness of any discussion. 
From the perspective of the media militarization critiques, the advance of ever 
more sophisticated media technologies allow a displacement or obfuscation of 
the reality of suffering bodies from the public communication of war: “In 
postmodern war, the central role of human bodies in war is being eclipsed 
rhetorically by the growing importance of machines in general” (Gray, 1997:46).  
This then, is an extreme form of the dangerous groundlessness of information 
age debate and its potential undermining of core lifeworld values by 
instrumentality: “[during Gulf War 1, US General] Schwarzkopf was able to make 
the extraordinary and, on the face of it, absurd contention that he was fighting a 
war without being in the business of killing largely because of the power of a 
system of [media] representations which marginalizes the presence of the body 
in war, fetishizes machines, and personalizes international conflicts while 
depersonalizing the people who die in them” (Gusterton, 1991:51). 
 The political identity and agenda of the military gamer groups, however, 
challenges the notion that the ergodic nature of the video game medium is a 
particularly seductive, immersive form of the trivialization of real war through the 
distancing from real bodies. The political exceptionalism of this arises from the 
premium the military gamers place upon asserting and securing their lifeworld 
status as differentiated from the mainstream civilian population of the America’s 
Army gamespace.  
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  Not only do the military gamer groups take special precautions in ensuring 
the veracity of their members’ claimed real world identities, but their shared 
experience of the US military lifeworld encourages them to develop off-line, face 
to face social relations in the context of the gamer group beyond the usual 
expectations of civilian gamer clans. Their discursive identity within the CMC 
context of the broader America’s Army community is consequently significantly 
more stabilized and rooted in their physical real life than the anonymous, 
multiple identities that civilian players can maintain. Interestingly, a couple of 
military gamers suggested to me that there were many more military America’s 
Army players than the small number represented with the Army Star designation 
– the explanation was that many military gamers preferred not to take on the 
official trappings so they could act more freely (swearing, horseplay etc.) within 
the gamespace without having to worry about protecting their professional 
image. This suggests those military players who choose to take on Army Stars 
and join the military gamer groups are committing themselves to the idea of 
using the America’s Army gamespace for purposes beyond that as mere escapist 
leisure. 
 These purposes are heightened during wartime, when the military gamers 
demonstrate a far more elaborate, conflicted, and empathic (even for those who 
have never seen actual combat) understanding of the uncanniness of playing the 
game than the civilian players, to the point where the gamespace’s basic 
function of providing gameplay becomes more than irrelevant, but taboo for the 
veterans. Instead, the seductive blurring of virtuality and reality, of 
entertainment and war suggested by the game provokes an anxiety that makes 
the gamespace as a site for asserting the embodied reality of war. These 
assertions are motivated by the fact that the majority of the members of these 
military groups have either been, or will be, deployed in combat themselves or 
personally know people who are actively deployed in the current war situation. 
These politically significant activities include the memorialization of dead soldiers, 
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 the community meditation upon the emotional upheaval of the war and the 
online communication and support network for deployed soldiers. And there is 
especially the concerns presented within the groups, and in the military gamers’ 
interactions with civilian players, that the game was nothing like the seriousness 
of real war51 - an affirmation of military lifeworld values that goes beyond the 
official institutional rationale for legitimation.  
 As the gamer generation expands and grows older, the likely effect of 
such recruiting and strategic communication projects as America’s Army is that 
the military gamer groups will rapidly grow in size, and their particular political 
positioning will be increasingly influential in shaping the civilian-military public 
interest discourse potential in the gamespace. 
 
 
 
Chapter 4:  Repurposing America’s Army: 
   The Christian Evangelists and the Discourse Critique 
The Discourse Critique 
  There have been numerous criticisms of what many see as the overly facile 
portrayal of internet discourse spaces as the new infrastructure for public 
spheres. These are relevant to the critique of the America’s Army gamespace 
here along several key lines. Firstly, the underlying technology required to 
support the new flows of communication represent a further dimension for the 
                                                     
51  Several military gamer interviewees stressed, for instance, from their own experience or 
those of others, that those who encouraged their children or young relatives to play the game 
would make a point of establishing the difference between the game and the violence of real 
combat. (JTF) W. related to me, for instance, how he used the internet to show his America’s 
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 exercise of hegemonic power relations. There is the potential for not only the 
consolidation of the existing advantages of privileged classes (those who can 
afford the technology and education needed) but also new forms of control over 
the distribution of information, skills, and responsibility - and consequently new 
formations of institutional authority (Winner, 1980).  In the case of the America’s 
Army project, there is a clear institutional intent for the reproduction of what can 
be understood as the hegemonic idea of the US Army as a key morally legitimate 
authority within American democracy. The incursion of the Army into video game 
popular culture here can be regarded as the colonization of new technologies for 
the purposes of consolidating and expanding the institution’s dimensions of 
power within society. 
 But the internet as a key contemporary site for the extension of dominant 
ideologies also has the quality of a space where, as Mark Poster (1995) has 
noted, the authority, rationality and stability of discourse and subject identity in 
cyberspace is constantly undermined by the fluidity, unaccountability and spatial-
temporal distortions of its own digital forms. This fluidity is positively seen as a 
guarantee of the multiplicity, anonymity, alterity and freedom of self-expression 
in cyberspace. The playfulness of the video game culture represents an 
especially strong manifestation of these qualities, even in the official gamespace 
of America’s Army. But as Poster has pointed out, these new postmodern 
conditions for identity and social engagement in the cyberspace are so different 
from those presumed by the Habermasian model that entirely new conceptions 
of technopolitical discourse need to be composed. The notion that the 
postmodern fluidity of subjectivity of cyberspace is constitutive of a utopian state 
of playful freedom leaves out the problems which arise from the dissolution of 
grounded subjectivity, and the promotion of an instantaneous and ephemeral 
character of communication. The trustworthiness of discourse becomes 
unrooted, and individuals are ontologically distanced from physical social reality 
                                                                                                                                                              
Army-playing godson the Vietnam War Memorial website, as well as photos depicting real combat 
casualties. 
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 and its material sense of responsibility. Whilst serious social relations and 
discourse ethics are possible in CMC spaces, this potential is seen as always 
under threat or in a state of flux in the public domains of cyberspace (Reid, 
2001).  
 These internet public debate spaces such as newsgroups are typically seen 
as wholly skewed in the composition of their population; prone to attract 
extremist opinions and those who deliberately resist rational debate; supportive 
of a quality of debate which is overwhelmed by opinion and emotion rather than 
fact and reason; and finally that most internet debate has little or no influence 
on political reality, and is plagued by triviality (Elvin, 2002). The very freedom of 
identity and expression associated with cyberspace anonymity is also suggested 
to lead to "the loss of identity and weakening of social norms and constraints 
associated with submergence in a group or a crowd”, and consequently the 
promotion of irrational communication (Spears & Lea, 1992:38). These criticisms 
are applicable to describing how much of the America’s Army forum discourse 
falls short of significant public sphere potential. 
 The military gamer groups, with their emphasis on stabilizing and securing 
their identity, status, and world-view, and their pronounced unease with the 
potential rootlessness of virtual community, would appear to challenge these 
discourse criticisms. However, they are vulnerable to another set of criticisms 
related to the positioning and effectiveness of politically significant discourse on 
the Internet.  
 Cass Sunstein has argued that even if the basic standards for grounded, 
reasonable and non-trivial discussion between internet forum participants are 
satisfied, the technical rationality of the internet infrastructure nevertheless 
encourages the “natural human tendency to make choices, with respect to 
entertainment and news, that do not disturb our preexisting view of the world” 
(2001:57). The social consequences of this is that as the internet becomes 
increasingly an integral part of people’s lives, the citizenry become engaged in 
 85 
 
 
 online communities which fragment the experience of the public into what are 
effectively “enclaves” of like-minded people with similar interests. A healthy 
democracy requires not only the support of public deliberation, but also the 
exposure of the public to a diverse and unpredictable range of perspectives and 
experiences. Sunstein (2001a) suggests that in contrast with personal 
experiences of community in traditional offline public spaces (such as the 
pavement, the park, and the town square) people who largely relate to others 
through online enclaves are far less likely to come across opposite opinions, 
unanticipated encounters, and issues outside their own sphere of interest.  In 
Habermasian terms, there is a loss of a universally shared lifeworld of 
heterogeneous public experience as a frame of reference for discursive 
interaction. And whilst the enclaves act effectively in themselves as spaces for 
community deliberation, their seclusion from the broad diversity of the public 
makes them, Sunstein argues, particularly vulnerable to groupthink and a drift to 
extremist and entrenched positions. 
 Sunstein concedes that the majority of internet community users will be 
exposed, voluntarily and not, to both online and offline diversity and unexpected 
information. However, he argues that if only a small percentage of internet users 
isolate themselves in internet-based enclaves, then this may represent a 
significant extremist minority of several millions, and so a broader potential 
problem for democracy. In the case of the military groups, the importance of 
differentiating their community and lifeworld identity from the civilian 
mainstream suggests that the enclave critique may be applicable to them, 
particularly given their status as a significant minority. For instance, in a 
comment that recalls the disconnection between the orderly life inside a military 
compound to the more chaotic civilian world outside, (JTF) C. complains that he 
prefers to play on the JTF servers since: 
 “[out on the public servers, there are] groups of [people] of a lot of 
different ages that try to influence our youth to do things they shouldn’t do.  
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 Hack, steal, lie, cheat, give out info they shouldn’t or maybe meet [people] they 
shouldn’t… Bunch of weirdos... That is one major problem with the gaming 
community, and the internet community at large....” 
 Whilst this kind of attitude, in various degrees, is common amongst the 
military gamers, this does not mean that they have only limited contact with the 
broader community of civilian America’s Army. JTF, on the contrary, makes a 
policy of reaching out to civilians through acting in an unofficial ambassadorial 
role on behalf of the military and as a moral guardian and role model in the 
gamespace. The JTF group leader, (JTF) W., has a particularly strong view of the 
need for military gamers to reach out to the civilian gamer culture52. (JTF) W. 
explained how important to JTF’s identity to act in an unofficial ambassadorial 
role to the civilian public: 
  
 “Yes, JTF does take a role in the community, most of us are military or 
related and also help in our communities and each other.  We want to be role 
models to our youth…[and offer] a helpful ear and communication that is 
missing in a lot of these youths’ present lives.” 
 
  (JTF) W. also emphasized that JTF was taking a number of real-world 
community projects upon itself – charity fundraising, and an adopt-a-highway 
scheme, and a special outreach to Junior ROTC  programs – and that this 
community spirit was a fundamental part of the “good old US of A”. 
 However, this spirit of outreach and engagement (along with the diversity 
of political opinion seen, for instance, in the discussion of serious topics on the 
1VB forum) suggests only that the enclave critique should be qualified in this 
                                                     
52  
After our interview, (JTF) W. made a point of sending me an article he had written for a local 
newspaper which called for readers to help post-9/11 America by doing more voluntary work and 
taking more civic responsibility in their local community. 
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 case. The outreach and diversity of opinion does not deal effectively with the 
criticism that majority of the discourse takes place between military gamers in 
private forums which are not accessible to the general public in the way a clan 
community forum usually is.  And the presence and outreach of military gamers 
in the public areas of the broader America’s Army gamespace, whilst their 
worldview and political position must be differentiated from that of the Army’s, 
recalls Michel Foucault’s image of soldiers marching in the town square, who 
remind the public of the proximity of disciplinary state power (1979). Even if 
their private opinions are diverse within the military group, the need to assert 
the exclusiveness and special identity of the military gamers encourages a 
tendency towards discursive enclaveness. This itself reinforces how their public 
but exclusionary presence can be seen as reproducing the hegemonic milieu of 
the gamespace. 
Alternative Fan Media and Christian Evangelists 
 Sunstein’s enclave argument has been criticized for its underestimation of 
the diversity of digital communication culture. As Henry Jenkins (2001) argues: 
“Sunstein assumes that we join virtual communities primarily on the basis of 
ideological identifications. Yet, many, if not most, Net discussion groups are not 
defined along party affiliations but rather around other kinds of shared 
interests... which frequently cut across political lines.” Jenkins, a scholar of video 
games, and of popular media fan cultures in general, suggests that the building 
of communities around popular entertainment experiences not only helps bring 
people with diverse opinions together, but the entertainment experiences also 
provide a consensual shared analogical frame of reference for discussing serious 
topics. He argues that “We should not underestimate such exchanges [within fan 
cultures] by maintaining a crisp separation of political dialogue from other kinds 
of social interaction.” 
 Whilst the military gaming groups represent a fan community which is 
composed to a significant degree along ideological lines (at least in the sense of 
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 the formal indoctrination of the military), the America’s Army fan community as a 
whole (and the broader gaming culture in general) functions less as an enclave 
and more like the kind of consensual frame of reference which Jenkins suggests. 
  One objection to this is that video games are still a marginalized media 
culture relative to established mainstream media, and so do not represent a 
sufficiently broad cross-section of the general public. However, as the OEMA 
rationale for the project recognizes, interactive entertainment media is steadily 
displacing traditional use and is likely to continue to do so into the future. And 
the reach of fan cultures, can extend well beyond the specialized local limits of 
fandom. As Jenkins notes, media-based fan cultures have always been active in 
appropriating, cross-fertilizing, and reassembling various elements of official and 
canonical popular culture works to create fan media artifacts  (Jenkins 1992, 
2000). This kind of fan activity has grown exponentially, becoming a mainstream 
practice with the popularization of the Internet and digital media manipulation 
technologies. Humorous, bizarre, scandalous or otherwise remarkable fan-made 
artifacts – pictures, movies, music etc. – are now much more easily and 
habitually distributed via the internet to people who would do not necessarily 
have a particular interest in the specific fan culture or even the specific media 
technology in question.   
 These fan media artifacts also represent the ease of which significant ideas, 
narratives, opinions, and identities can be communicated digitally across cultural 
lines in ways which are non-discursive and not necessarily according to a serious 
aesthetic. These kinds of public expression lie outside the traditional, rational, 
conversational norms of communication which Habermas confines his ideal type 
model to. 
 For instance, one visually powerful expression of the military gamers’ desire 
for differentiation from the civilian gamer lifeworld in these forums are the 
graphics styles seen in player’s “sigs” (large decorative graphic signature banners 
that mark a player’s post to any forum). Sigs in the military communities almost 
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 invariably follow military themes – photographs of soldiers, military heraldry, 
service insignia etc. In comparison, sigs in civilian clans can be typically 
characterized as bizarre, wacky, and irreverent, often drawing on the 
idiosyncracies of obscure internet humor. In public spaces, such as the official 
America’s Army forums or other general access forums, military and civilian sigs 
are juxtaposed incongruously against each other. More ambitious and 
sophisticated uses of consumer media software and technology repurpose 
symbolic elements of the America’s Army video game itself. One major instance 
of this is the appropriation and re-articulation of in-game graphics for fan-
created movies and cartoon strips. 
 Given the multiplayer character of America’s Army (and the impossibility 
to date of modifying the game engine substantially), the creation of a fan movie 
using more than a few avatars and filmed directly from the on-screen 
representation of live avatar action, requires the substantial co-ordination and 
even choreography of multiple players geographically dispersed in physical space 
whilst acting in carefully planned concert in the virtual space. For instance, these 
fan movies are most often done to re-enact clan victories and tactics, or to 
humorously use the avatars and environments of America’s Army for other kinds 
of performance-based communicative actions. One of the most popular 
humorous fan-made videos is of players controlling game avatars in co-
ordination to make up a kind of hip-hop chorus line. The bodies of the avatars 
are lined up in formation and moved carefully in pattern, executing such 
maneuvers as spinning around on one spot, with a repetitive arm movements – 
and all this done in time to the music and to the other players virtually present. 
Another popular example of fan movie humor include coordinated collective 
“suicides” of avatars in unlikely and unseemly ways – leaping off bridges etc. 
These examples of synchronous and skillful co-operation within cyberspace show 
how sophisticated, creative, and social the enactment of non-discursive 
communicative actions can be. 
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  In a Gulf War 2 movie made through the cooperation of some twenty 
members of the 1VB “acting” in virtual gamespace as both virtual US soldiers 
and enemy “Iraqis”, a more serious real-life public interest issue is addressed. 
The movie is entitled “Hostage Rescue”53, staged on the Radio Tower desert 
level, and set to dramatic battle music from the Hollywood movie Gladiator 
(2000). The movie was directed and produced by a Gulf War 1 veteran who told 
me that he had the original idea for the project from reviewing camcorder tapes 
he had made of his real-life GW1 experiences for his family back home. The 
subject of “Hostage Rescue” was set in direct response to 1VB’s anxiety for US 
POWs during Gulf War 2. A key scene in the first part of the movie is an eerie re-
staging (using game avatars and graphics and complete with authentic Al-
Jazeera graphics appropriated from the internet) of the infamous footage of 
dead US soldiers captured by Iraqis as broadcast by the Arab news network Al-
Jazeera during the conflict. The rest of the movie is a carefully choreographed 
and precise staging of the exact military squad formations and tactics that 1VB 
members believed would ideally be used in a hostage/POW rescue situation. The 
production and distribution of the movie is regarded, along with the aid package 
effort, within 1VB as the most significant collective creative effort to demonstrate 
community unity and pride in the face of wartime concerns.  
 Real-world concerns and issues of war leak into the composition of the 
fan-made America’s Army cartoon strips as well, even though this repurposed 
use of game graphics for fan narrative tends to be considerably more bizarre, 
irreverent, and carnivalesque than the uses seen in fan movies (which, after all. 
requires a significant degree of consensus between players to produce – a 
cartoon strip can simply be made by one player and a photo manipulation 
software package). 
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  The most widely read examples of these fan cartoon America’s Army 
narratives can be found on the popular America’s Army dedicated website, 
www.militarysim.com54. Authored by someone under the outlandish pseudonym 
of “VANSHNOOKENRAGGEN”, these comics mix America’s Army settings and 
characters with graphics from elsewhere to create surreal, jokey, and wacky 
stories about elements of America’s Army player culture. Topics covered include 
the ridiculous attitude and behavior of cheaters, newbies (that is, novice players, 
or “n00bs”), slackers (or “stoners”/“hippies”), and developers; the questionable 
suitability of immature gamers for military recruitment, and the impatience of 
players for new level releases and bug corrections.  
 One of the most interesting militarysim.com cartoon strips is one entitled 
“Patchtastic!”55 which simultaneously records – in an ironic intertwining - a key 
event in the America’s Army fan community history and the real-life historical 
event of the outbreak of Gulf War 2. The narrative begins with a depiction of a 
experienced America’s Army player in avatar from recounting important stories 
from America’s Army history to newbie avatars – and specificially, “the tale of 
the great patch disaster of 1.6”.  At around the time of the final stages of the US 
military buildup in the Gulf, an incomplete version of the 1.6 America’s Army 
software update (containing some mission and code data that was not supposed 
to be part of the official release) was leaked to the player community, and widely 
distributed against the official wishes of the project. This version also caused 
technical problems on numerous player computers and servers, and there was 
general consternation about this in the player community. As the cartoon strip 
has it: 
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 this website is run by a former member of the America’s Army developer team  - the only one 
who had significant experience both in games development and in the Army. 
55  
http://www.militarysim.com/modules.php?name=Content&pa-showpage&pid=253
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 “The [developers] tried to catch the patch before it got out but it was too 
late. The flood gates had opened and thousands of people got the wrong 
patch… The patch was a corrupt file! It was a virus that overpowered the users 
computers! Something had to be done before this Virus of Mass Destruction 
could be spread world wide by cyber terrorists.” 
 
 And then in a leap of twisted logic into the events unfolding at the same 
time in the real world, the narrative cuts to a picture of President George W. 
Bush giving a speech about the coming war with Iraq at the United Nations. The 
text reads: “That night the president went on national TV to speak to America 
about the new threat…” and Bush is depicted as saying that the patch virus must 
be stopped by “getting rid of Saddam Hussein”. The narrative of the imaginary 
threat of the computer virus unleashed by the leaked 1.6 patch fiasco merges 
into Bush’s narrative about the need for military action in Iraq. 
 By the end of the strip, the correct patch was released by the developers, 
and “all was well”. The narrator finally tells the newbies: 
 
“Let this be a lesson to you. This only happened because of some selfish 
nOObs who wanted everything. They put pressure on the situation and they only 
made things worse.” 
 
The newbies then ask “But why did they release the wrong patch??”, and 
the final picture is a photograph of US tanks in the Gulf with a cartoon sign 
saying “100km to Baghdad” with the experienced player responding: “I suspect 
that the Army had other things on their minds when they sent out the wrong 
patch. Anyway it doesn’t really matter, it is only a game.” 
 
This surreal combination of fan culture narrative and real history narrative 
exhibits a self-critical, self-aware irony about the triviality of video gaming, and 
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 the complaints of players, in comparison to real world political events, whilst at 
the same time showing respect for the Army, and reminding readers what the 
military’s real mission is. There is further, subtler suggestion of an ironic 
subversion of the Bush administration’s rhetoric about Iraqi Weapons of Mass 
Destruction  - the portrayal of Bush making war claims based on the ludicrous 
idea of a patch 1.6 virus being a threat to national security suggests that there is 
room for being wary of his claims whilst at the same time as preserving 
admiration for the US armed forces.  
 A serious social meaning and communication can underlie even the most 
bizarre and outlandish fan culture narratives. The comic strip “As the Bullets 
Fly”56 is particularly carnivalesque and surreal. Its plot is a disconcerting 
rendition of campy daytime soap opera dialogue between five weird characters 
sitting in a recreation room that forms part of America’s Army’s Alaskan pipeline 
station mission. The main characters are represented by photo images of a 
purple flame, a nerdy comedy character from the TV show Saturday Night Live, a 
captured Al-Qaeda terrorist whose image was widely circulated in the news 
media, a grotesque-looking elderly Asian man, and Joe Madden, the American 
football commentator.  The humor of the narrative is obscure, but the ultimate 
purpose of the strip is its tribute and show of support to a member of the 
America’s Army development team who has been deployed to the Gulf. 
 These movie and cartoon examples demonstrate how non-discursive 
communications and alternative narratives can mix the symbolic elements of 
America’s Army with others drawn from other domains of popular culture and 
general public consciousness. This facilitates the communication of serious topics 
to a broader audience who may not have an interest in the game culture, but 
may still be able to watch a movie, or to read a website comic.  
 However, the examples cited above are limited by their production primarily 
for the consumption within the local video game culture. Whilst these artifacts 
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 could cross community and cultural lines and be re-read with various degrees of 
effectiveness outside the domain of the America’s Army community, these 
artifacts are produced without any sense of a specific political agenda that seeks 
to disseminate ideas to a broader community. Whilst the military gamer groups 
are making efforts to reach out to the civilian players, this is done in the context 
of the gamespace, which is already dominated and shaped by the real-life 
military theme. One gamer community that does have a specific, proactive 
political and public interest agenda that seeks to circulate non-trivial ideologies 
through fan culture in ways which have a significance beyond the gamespace are 
the Christian Evangelicals who make up the clan “Men of God”. 
Christian Evangelicals 
 One of the most interesting and successful repurposing of the AA 
gamespace for alternative socio-political uses by civil society is actually a 
recruiting effort of a nature quite different from the US Army’s strategic 
communication rationale. The Men of God International clan (MoG), founded by 
the actual pastor of a US church community, is a Christian Evangelical gamer 
group that seeks to reach out to and convert online gameplayers. At the 
moment, their activities are concentrated on five of the most popular online 
FPSs, including America’s Army. Members of MoG are easily recognizable (even if 
they were not to have their clan indicator in their name) from the religious 
character of their game names (e.g. “Proverbs226”, “GraceofGod”, “Saved One”) 
and the pronounced meekness of their behavior in-game57. Their website 
(menofgod.us) is a unique blend of gamer clan, Christian web portal, and an 
organized media operation of the religious right. For instance, they have all the 
usual features of a gamer clan site, but with the addition of prayer sections in 
the fan forums with the discussion of proper Christian morality, Bible study 
sessions and sermons using FPS voice comms, a dedicated ministry team, and 
                                                     
57  even in the face of sustained game chat abuse from other players.
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 links to Christian Evangelical news, music, television, and online film sites on the 
front page. There are even attempts at Christian music produced specifically for 
the MoG clan. The level of organization and practical commitment to the task of 
converting non-Christians has reached the point where MoG has a complex 
bureaucratic structure, with the creation of special “Youth Divisions” for each 
game, and the creation of an “Office of Central Communications” to ensure 
efficient centralization of information and facilitation of communication between 
the multiple levels of responsibility.  
 The appropriation and repurposing of the America’s Army gamespace is 
taken to the point that the main image on the page of the MoG America’s Army 
division58 is one of Jesus Christ overlooking the famous “crucifix” of steel 
supports found standing in the 9/11 Twin Towers wrecking, upon which the 
America’s Army logo has been emblazoned. Standing in front of the crucifix are 
three America’s Army avatars – the middle one, a Kalashnikov-toting, bearded 
OPFOR figure with a resemblance to Jesus.  
 The member’s pledge for MoG mixes military terminology with the Biblical:  
 
“OFFICER’S PLEDGE 
I hereby accept this commission as an officer in the Men of God Squad, on 
behalf of my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. I fully understand my duties and 
responsibilities and undertake to perform the same to the best of my abilities by 
the grace of Almighty God. (Col 3:23,24). I shall endeavor to consistently 
improve upon the existing structure while seeking and implementing new ideas 
for the good of the cause, which shall provide for a more efficient and seamless 
Squad pursuant to Kingdom authority found in Holy Scripture (Eph. 4:11-13). I 
shall not place the Men of God Squad ahead or before the divine order of God, 
Family and Career, albeit I recognize the importance of the Squad to bring 
                                                     
58  see http://menofgod.us/aa/ 
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 unsaved souls to eternal salvation by the saving blood of Jesus Christ, to which I 
am thus dedicated. (Mark 16:15).” 
 
The MoG’s FAQ further explains the purpose and rationale of the group: 
“Men of God International is an online community of men, women and 
children with one purpose and that is to win souls for Jesus through a unique 
and growing population of online gaming. Online gaming is the largest and 
fastest growing community in the world today.  […] In one game alone there are 
over four hundred thousand players at any one given time, day or night. At 
present Men of God is occupying five such games and is finding great success in 
sharing the Love of Jesus Christ to people all over the world. Some of the games 
we play are typically something that you would not think of, yet the population 
in these games are staggering and the fields of lost souls are ready for harvest. 
You are Christians and you play War Games? Why? To us it’s just a pc game and 
nothing more than that. There are some that would like to make more of it but 
to us it’s just a game. No more no less. We have fun playing but most of all we 
love the fellowship we have with each other and sharing our FAITH and LOVE of 
JESUS CHRIST… May God Bless you Richly, General LORD’s Soldier.” 
  
 MoG’s repurposing of FPS gamespaces such as America’s Army into 
religious communities of prayer fellowship demonstrate the growth of a 
combination of system rationality (bureaucratic organization and professional 
communications management) and lifeworld communication. The assertive moral 
agenda seen here aimed at personally convincing the unconverted through the 
virtual gamespace is potentially as powerful as the official US Army 
communications rationale for the game project.   
 The MoG clan, whilst appearing to be a disconcerting, incongruous or 
even scandalous mixture of Christianity and video war gameplaying, is actually 
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 adapting a media strategy quite typical of American Evangelicism’s efforts to 
expand its influence in popular culture. Like the Army, Evangelicals in America 
today are increasingly committed to the notion that cyberspace outreach is vital 
for appealing to the young. Research by Christian pollsters have indicated that 
the overwhelming majority of young American Christians expect a “cyberchurch” 
to replace the traditional physical church (Barnard, 1998). Others have argued 
that the potential loss of the benefits of face-to-face congregation must be 
balanced against the benefits of CMC for expanding the Evangelical public.  It is 
suggested that CMC spaces have “the twinned effect of making religious 
expression easier but more individualistic” through  “lower[ing] barriers to 
participation and expression and weak[ening] the traditional hold that centralized 
authorities […] have over the production of social and intellectual capital” (Katz 
& Rice 2002: 296).   
Andrew Careaga (1999, 2001), a leading proponent of online evangelism 
for the digital generation has characterized the history of the expansion of 
evangelism in the United States as being shaped by several communications 
revolutions, each requiring innovative Evangelical Christians to pioneer 
missionary efforts in new mass entertainment and information spaces. This 
expansion into new media social formations generated a pragmatic dialectic 
between secular popular entertainment culture and Evangelical Christianity. The 
typical result was a carefully managed “fusion of dissonant cultural practices” 
(Harding 2000:4). 
Campbell (1998) notes that whilst conservative Evangelical Christianity is 
still a dominant lifeworld in many parts of the United States, its decline since the 
1980s Moral Majority phenomenon has seen a shift in Evangelical identity to one 
which asserts its legitimacy and expansion through claims of marginalization. In 
the online world, and particularly the more controversial or supposedly trivial 
spheres such gamer culture, this marginalization is genuine. Campbell argues 
that this marginal positioning “provides the impetus for evangelical revival, and a 
resurgent interest in innovative evangelical techniques such as adaptive 
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 strategies.” Moreover, these strategies for revival are articulated primary through 
a “spiritual networking narrative” that:  
 
 “is supported by two metaphors coming out of the community’s dialogue. 
They can be referred to as the Pioneer/Manifest Destiny metaphor and the 
Warfare/Battle Plan metaphor. The Pioneer metaphor comes from [the] settlers 
who came to America to colonise the "new" land [which is seen] as a positive 
venture, involving a "manifest destiny" […] The Warfare metaphor… establishes 
the fact the group is being faced with an enemy, seeking to prevent their 
exploration and expansion.” 
 
These metaphors can be seen to be articulated in the inspirational 
language of the MoG community – new ventures into the mainstream gaming 
culture are discussed as operations against “the enemy”, and the task of 
“harvesting” souls suggests the colonization and seeding of new territories. 
The key goals of the strategies of adaptation and fusion in the modern 
Evangelical tradition have been the development of spaces where not only could 
the unconverted willingly accept personal and intimate messages from the 
evangelical ministry, but through which the lifeworlds of popular culture and 
organized religion could be joined through the active integration and repurposing 
of popular culture symbols and practices. This can be seen in the adaptation of 
typical gamer community structures by the MoG clan; the manipulation of 
appropriated imagery such as the America’s Army Jesus picture; their 
participation on the public game servers; and the technical networking with 
other Christian media outlets. The ultimate purpose of this fusion, however is not 
to be satisfied with potential converts inhabiting an overlapping hybrid space 
between the hegemonic secular lifeworld and the religious alternative.  It is 
rather, to direct the potential converts to exposure to the crucial, central form of 
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 communicative reason in the Evangelical lifeworld – that is, the linguistic power 
of Evangelicals.  
  McCarthy (2000) notes that “Language is the power base of evangelicals, 
their linguistic strategies are deeply held and often the subject of discussion.” 
These strategies include adaptation and hybridization but ultimately the goal is 
ease the potential convert into a religious lifeworld where communication 
primarily takes place in terms of the traditional linguistic and communal practices 
of the Church. So, for instance, the way in which voice communications 
technology is transformed from a site for discussing game tactics and expressing 
enjoyment of playing America’s Army into a networked space for oral ministry 
and spiritual testimony. By establishing an online presence in a position of 
duality and transition between the escapist virtual game world and the grounded 
reality of religious ministry, a “transformational gateway” is established and 
legitimated for the purpose of attracting converts, and directing them into 
another discursive domain or specific public.  
 
Implications for the Discourse Critique 
 The two key parts of the discourse critique considered here as most 
relevant to the America’s Army gamespace are firstly the notion that politically 
significant, reasonable interactions are impossible in the public sphere without 
discourse in the normative Habermasian sense (and that cyberspace is 
particularly impoverished in this regard); and secondly, the suggestion that even 
in the case of ideal rational discourse within a community, the technical 
structuring logic of the internet means that such communities have enclave 
tendencies, and any cyberspace public will be fraught with fragmentation. 
 The FPS gamer culture can be considered as both highly non-normative or 
non-discursive in communication content as well as being marginalized and 
isolated from the mainstream public. But the example of the Christian Evangelist 
activities in the America’s Army gamespace demonstrates how non-normative, 
non-discursive activities not only can be put to significant and rational political 
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 purposes, but also work to introduce and embed new public sphere domains and 
discursive forms in ways which actively undermine any enclave tendencies 
inherent in the gamespace. 
 The primacy placed on missionary outreach and conversion means that 
the discourse within the Evangelical sphere never becomes enclave-like. Unlike 
the military gamer groups who are invested in maintaining a fixed ideal public 
image however diverse their worldviews may be privately, the essential dynamic 
of Evangelical communities such as MoG is characterized by the constant re-
adaptation and re-framing of their public styles of communicative action, 
symbolic rhetoric, and cultural practice in accordance with the flux of 
mainstream popular culture. This dynamic is driven by the desire to nurture 
familiarity and intimacy with the private conscience of individuals.  
 The MoG clan represents a continuation of the Evangelical tradition of 
public discursive engagement with new media forms into the gamer culture. 
Their activities demonstrate the extent to the technical and symbolic repurposing 
of the America’s Army gamespace can generate an alternative public space with 
a strong sense of political mission outside the official rationale, and distinct from 
its cultural logic. Moreover, the creation of an integrative, transformational, or 
dualistic space through the MoG community as a means of recontextualizing the 
symbolic experience of FPS gamers also indicates the limitations of the 
normative Habermasian framework in understanding how different forms of 
publics can be appropriated, re-interpreted, and linked or even fused with one 
another, particularly through the translation, reconfiguration and repurposing of 
artifacts and significations across cultural lines. In preparing them for the 
linguistic strategies of the Evangelicals, this also demonstrates how the non-
discursive communicative actions (gameplaying, fan artifact creation) can be 
deployed to draw individuals into new forms of non-trivial, rational discursive 
communication in a new public (in this case, in the form of Evangelical ministry). 
This potential of reconfiguring the experience of publics also encompasses the 
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 possibilities of new orderings, uses, and combinations of lifeworlds and systems 
within the structuring of the public – for instance, the bureaucratization of the 
MoG communications management.  
 Finally, the case of the Christian Evangelist FPS clan here shows how 
these non-official politically significant activities can take place with an expansive 
logic and to a widespread degree without necessarily being seen as disruptive or 
contrary to the overarching official and hegemonic logics of the gamespace. 
Consequently, the public sphere potential of such activities can be understood as 
evidence of the capacity of the America’s Army gamespace for supporting non-
official, non-trivial political activities and agendas which enrich the range of 
social practice and significance in the community without undermining the 
gamespace itself.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 5:  Hacking America’s Army: 
   Cheats, Hackers, and the Commodification  
   Critique 
 
The Commodification Critique 
 The exceptional community of the MoG comprehensively repurposes the  
America’s Army gamespace for an expansionary political agenda quite alien  to 
the official rationale and its normative expectations of the gamespace.   
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 The MoG Evangelical agenda goes far beyond the limits of simple freedom of 
expression since it is actively aimed at reconfiguring the lifeworld context of the 
gamespace. Moreover, it does so through exploiting the very Army-owned 
infrastructure and symbolic capital that underlies the game. What might said to 
be furthermore remarkable about this co-option of the state-managed 
gamespace by a civil society group is that it is tolerated by the America’s Army 
authorities. But significantly, the missionary activities of MoG on other 
commercial multiplayer online gamespaces are also well-known and tolerated – 
for instance, in several gamespaces owned by the major video games 
corporation, Electronic Arts59. The implication here is that activist groups with 
alternative logics such as MoG are allowed to thrive so long as they do not 
disrupt or repurpose the public space in ways which undermine the overarching 
commercial logic of the gamespace (the monopolization of the gamespace’s 
substantive economic impact by the controlling authority) or the basic normative 
community expectations of gamer culture (privacy, freedom from harassment, 
freedom of reasonable speech, and fun). 
 Jodi Dean (2001, 2002) has argued that the anxieties over the public  
sphere potential of the internet can be generally characterized by two 
contradictory perspectives - either that there is a lack of valid discourse capacity 
on the Internet, or that there is an excess of norms. She argues  
that these anxieties, which assume that the public sphere is still an ideal to 
aspire to, masks how the internet debate works as "an ideology of publicity in 
the service of communicative capitalism" (2001:4). That is, both the anxieties 
over the lack of key components required for the public sphere, and over the 
excess of irrational, untrustworthy communication are used as arguments for 
new regulatory policies and technologies of security, control, censorship, 
identification etc. The regulation of the internet infrastructure in these ways is 
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 generally aimed at ensuring and legitimizing the institutionalization of internet 
public space primarily as a site for commercial rationale.   
 In the case of America’s Army, whilst the institutionalization of the 
gamespace is not directly commercial in the sense of a for-profit, transaction-
orientated enterprise, it nevertheless depends upon a technical rationale of 
commercial publicity. The gamespace is ultimately generated and maintained so 
long as its economic instrumentality is able to excel in terms of quantitative 
measures such as cost-effectiveness and return on investment.  
 Dean suggests that the promise of the romantic techno-libertarian ideal of 
a cyberspace-based public sphere works to obscure the fundamental commercial 
logic that controls the material existence of the internet infrastructure. For Dean, 
the fulfillment of public expectations for internet free speech (such on the official 
America’s Army forums) represents an ideology of publicity (pace Habermas) 
which facilitates "the commodification of communication [through which] more 
and more domains of life seem to have been reformatted in terms of market and 
spectacle as if the valuation itself had been rewritten in binary code" (4).  
 Such a facilitation can operate, as might be seen in the official OEMA 
economic rationale for America’s Army, in terms of the translation or conflation 
of economic information freedoms with freedom of expression. So long as this 
translation successfully operates and is not challenged by exceptionally 
politicized groups within the game community, the lifeworld of the gamespace 
can continue to legitimate the operation of economic instrumentality in this 
public space. This legitimation on the ideological level communicates that the 
game is free and so has the appearance of a non-commodity; the gameplay 
represents the defense of American cultural freedoms which the national 
lifeworld is based upon; the players have freedom of expression on the forums 
and so democracy is seen to be exercised. But this legitimation, by establishing 
the gamespace as an acceptable public space for the creation of community by 
the citizenry, also adds two further, and crucial, dimensions to the economic 
logic of the enterprise. 
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  Firstly, the development of fan community creates a pool of potential 
grassroots activists with their own dynamic for promoting and defending both 
the game itself and perhaps also the institutional ideology the game is supposed 
to communicate. The spontaneous mobilization of America’s Army fans against 
ABC and Jack Thompson for condemning the game is an example of this. The 
creation of apparently grassroots activist groups in public spaces is a widespread 
corporate strategy within democratic capitalism, and an important element of 
current notions of “viral” or consumer-led marketing (Grefe & Linsky 1995).  
 Secondly, in the digital age, the distribution of technological capacities  
amongst the public empowers consumers to be prolific producers of consumer 
culture themselves. This means that fan communities can be encouraged to 
freely contribute very significant quantities of both their own technological 
capital and their human capital in the form of leisure time as free labor, in 
support of the maintenance and expansion of a commercial enterprise 
(Terranova 2000). For instance, a prominent economic measure of the game 
project’s success as used in the OEMA internal documents, are the cost-savings 
from fans hiring or even buying their own servers for general public use – these 
fan servers actually account for the majority of the America’s Army public 
servers. Other instances include the fan production of websites with guides to 
the game, of artifacts such as the movies and cartoons which enrich and extend 
the experience and diversity of the gamespace, and of software utility programs 
which add technical functions to the game program that were previously 
unsupported by the official development team (there are several entirely fan-
produced software programs which facilitate a player’s search for team-members 
and opponents of an appropriate skill level, or for previously encountered 
players).  
 From Dean’s critical perspective, these economic benefits of successful 
publicity would signal the positioning of the internet public space as a "zero 
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 institution"60. That is, an institution with no positive function or determinate 
meaning in itself at all other then to signify the presence of a social institution – 
a presence which masks the material economic exploitation of free labour and 
civil community. Dean argues that this masking brackets conflict through 
expressing antagonisms and differences at the same time as obliterating them 
by negating their material political dynamic, in the similar way that Habermas' 
fantasy of consensus and norms obscured struggle. In an echo of Habermas' 
original anxiety about the fate of the bourgeois public sphere, Dean writes 
"communicative capitalism has turned the utopian ideal of the public sphere into 
its opposite"(12).  
 So, given the case of the Evangelical Christians, not only is their political 
agenda is dependent upon the dominant ideology of publicity and the 
commercial logic which sustains the gamespace (there would be no gamer 
community to minister to without freedom of expression and the commercial 
infrastructure), but their community’s expansionary tendencies actually increase 
the experiential and physical capital of the gamespace (in terms of time and 
technological infrastructure contributed). From the perspective of public sphere 
theory, the problem with this is that the democratic exercise of communicative 
action is put into the service of instrumental and commercial logics. Regardless 
of the content of the communications or the form of the repurposing, it is the 
economic contribution which substantively counts, so long as it does not 
challenge the fundamental premise and legitimacy of the enterprise. And these 
conditions do not obviously appear as exploitative, given the legitimated 
translation of economic and political freedoms under the rubric of the 
information age.  
 This raises the question of what range of politically significant expressions 
and activities would fundamentally challenge the underlying economic logic of 
the gamespace and so would be considered unacceptable repurposing of the 
                                                     
60  a term she borrows from Slavoj Zizek’s reading of Levi-Strauss. 
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 public sphere in the view of the controlling authorities? Or to pose the question 
critically from Dean’s perspective on communicative capitalism, what kinds of 
political communication and activity can fully escape and undermine the internet 
ideology of publicity?  
 Subversion in the spirit of inventive play is a central part of gamer culture 
and practice. There is a norm in spaces of play of what the anthropologist Victor 
Turner termed “liminality” (1982). By this, Turner meant the quality of 
playfulness which operates as a threshold between reality and unreality – this in 
fact, is an essential attraction of the escapism or the freedom of play and games. 
This detachment from reality allows a temporary license within these spaces for 
the “safe” or inconsequential enactments of inversion, tricksterism, the 
carnivalesque, and other kinds of subversive or taboo activities and 
representations which would otherwise be unacceptable.  Turner argued that it 
was this quality of play which makes it fundamental to play’s “seriousness” as a 
socio-cultural practice. 
 In the case of America’s Army, it is through this key game culture quality of 
liminality that the limits of officially acceptable public activity are found. There is 
an ambivalence over the official definition of what is and is not consequential – 
at what point does trivial playfulness turns into harmful subversiveness? This 
ambivalence exists because a degree of the subversiveness must be tolerated if 
the legitimacy of America’s Army as a bona fide game culture and free arena for 
play is to be maintained for the players. Subversiveness which takes place 
merely on the level of alternative but not resistive communicative action within 
the public sphere (as in the fan artifacts, and the MoG repurposing) is “safe” as 
it does not escape or expose the underlying economic and technical operations 
of the enterprise. But there are subversive player interpretations of the official 
game context which threaten the project’s formal economic logic and ideological 
communication function of the project and so cannot be easily suppressed by 
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 enforcement nor effectively subsumed into the “free labor” economic dimension 
of the gamespace freedom. 
 A major example of this kind of problematic player subversiveness is the 
widespread understanding amongst the fan community that the Honor score 
system does not quite work as officially intended. This threatens the 
fundamental rationale of the game project as the Honor score system is the 
lynchpin of the game’s communication of Army moral values. Serious violations 
which lower a player’s Honor score dramatically such as the killing of teammates 
not only lead to the immediate expulsion of the player from the game in 
progress, but sends his avatar to a virtual representation of a real military prison. 
But the association of the Honor score with these kinds of structural and 
symbolic sanctions as well as the prestige of becoming expert at the game 
(better performances increase one’s Honor score) do not guarantee player 
adherence to the formal meaning of the Honor score system.  
 For instance, one topic of conversation and humor which arose in several 
game sessions I observed was the disregard with which many players view very 
high Honor scores. This was seen as evidence that the high Honor player 
possibly spends too much time playing the game, and consequently “has no life”. 
Interviewees also suggested that once a player gets over the Honor score levels 
required to play on advanced servers, and train for special units, higher scores 
lack practical and even symbolic significance. Furthermore, sanctions such as 
being thrown out of a game into virtual prison temporarily, and even the 
ultimate sanction provoked by the Honor score system – deletion of a player’s 
account if his score falls to zero – were often dismissed as trivial. One can 
always rejoin the game or move to another server, or create a new account. 
(1VB) B. expressed the frustration of military gamers with the poor attitudes of 
the majority of civilian players towards the values represented by the Honor 
score system and its promotion of teamwork: 
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  “[the developers] tried to use the Honor system as a way to entice people 
to play as teams and lead… but I think that has not really worked… and if people 
do not really care to do it then it is not going to happen. It really is a player 
issue.  In the general game world, everyone just kind of does their own thing, 
there is not really any consistent teamwork or leadership being displayed.” 
 
 Implementing more serious sanctions – such as the complete and 
permanent banning or punishment of players who persistently subvert the Honor 
system – would also be seen as insisting upon and enforcing the official meaning 
of the game which would undermine the legitimacy of the gamespace as a freely 
liminal experience.  
 Another consequence of the attractiveness of subverting the game 
rules, and the lack of strong adherence or even respect for the formal ethics of 
gameplay is the widespread incidence of cheating. Cheating – seeking unfair 
advantages which either break or are not covered by the formal game rules is 
considered by many players to be something of an unofficial norm. Whilst it is 
also generally held that the institutional context and the attempt at embedding 
moral values into the game mechanics have had some success in that cheating 
appears to be less common than in other equivalent online FPS games 
(Counterstrike was frequently cited in interviews), there is also a conventional 
wisdom which puts the proportion of players who repeatedly cheat in some way 
at over 50%. 
   The most common way of cheating in America’s Army is one 
which is actually tacitly facilitated by the official authorities. There are cheat 
codes built into the software by the developers who recognize the desire of 
gamers to use cheats, not primarily to gain advantage over others, but to 
experiment with overcoming various limits imposed by the game mechanics. 
These cheats are easily typed in, and can be readily found on many unofficial fan 
websites.  They enable features which allow players to experience extreme 
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 performances in the game such as cheating the laws of physics, becoming 
invulnerable, having access to weapons of your choice with infinite ammunition 
etc.  New game experiences can be created from deliberate manipulation of 
these codes – for instance, a mission where all players are armed with sniper 
rifles, instead of the realistic distribution of weapons. These semi-official cheats 
are only operable though on unofficial servers (games on such servers do not 
affect a players’ Honor score positively or negatively). This condition marks an 
attempt by the authorities to cordon off zones of subversive liminality at the 
same time as tolerating them.  
 Other kinds of cheating difficult to detect or to define precisely – 
for instance, maximizing the brightness of one’s computer monitor screen in 
order to see better when a game mission takes place in virtual nighttime. An 
example of an ambiguous cheat is how the memorization of the exact geography 
of mission levels is a common kind of training for many clans. This memorization 
is undertaken to the point, for instance, when players can learn to predict the 
movements of enemy players, and fire grenades precisely at target areas beyond 
visual range. Such abilities are unrealistic, but not technically in violation of the 
rules. 
 The most severe form of cheating however, is the use of a hack – a 
program which interferes with the game on the level of code so that players may 
radically manipulate the mechanics of the game even on official servers. This is 
the most unacceptable form of subversive practice since it breaches the security 
of the game’s technical structure itself. What makes this kind of subversion even 
more threatening to the official rationale of the game, is that the hacks are 
produced by a community of computer programmers (“hackers”) with no interest 
in the game other than to manipulate and master the game code. 
 
The Hackers 
 The most popular hack program produced specifically for America’s 
Army is known as “Evilhack”. The creators of Evilhack suggest that perhaps two-
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 thirds of the total America’s Army player community have used the program at 
some point.  (eh) H., a core member of the Evilhack groups described to me how 
the hack operates:  
 
 “EvilHack is a program that injects its code into the runtime [software] 
environment of [the America’s Army game]. It filters and modifies the calls which 
[the game] makes to your system. These calls are mostly limited to input/output 
devices of your system, but it also hooks calls that [the game’s anti-hack 
precautions] would use to identify the presence of EH.” 
 
 It is this technical level of code and machine operation which is of interest 
to the hackers, not the manipulation of the game environment in itself. The 
evilhack.sourceforge.net website is revealing in this regard. For one thing, it is 
hosted on a major open source software coder community site, sourceforge.net, 
which not associated with gamer culture in any way. The Evilhack website is very 
different from the gamer clan sites described previously. It is completely devoid 
of any America’s Army imagery, or any decorative graphics for that matter. The 
website presentation style that of the, austere, generic sourceforge design. The 
core programmers of Evilhack whom I interviewed also stressed how they 
quickly lost interest in playing the game itself, and also how they identified 
themselves as programmers and not as gamers. As the founder of the evilhack 
group, (eh) E. remarked: 
 
 “Computer games only play an inferior role in my life. The army game 
was nice but it became boring very quickly so I decided to look what it does 
technically to see if I could somehow modify it to gain unfair advantages. 
Evilhack was born. Today I’m not interested in the game at all and I think I 
haven’t played it for some months now.” 
 
 111 
 
 
